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Credit on Wheels: The Law and
Business of Auto-Title Lending
Jim Hawkins∗
Abstract
Despite the fact that they are used by millions of Americans,
auto-title loans have received little attention in the legal literature
about consumer credit. Friends and foes of title lending make
confident statements about their net welfare effects, but we still lack
empirical data on many of the central policy questions that title
lending raises. This Article offers new evidence about the title
lending transaction, paying special attention to the risks borrowers
face when they use their vehicles as collateral for the loan. I
gathered this evidence by obtaining new reports from state
regulators about the title lending industry, examining public
disclosure statements by title lenders, interviewing title lenders,
and surveying a small group of title lending customers.
Additionally, the Article organizes the different legal responses to
title lending, creating a taxonomy of regulatory approaches. Based
on the new data uncovered by my research, I offer tentative
evaluations of these diverse regulatory strategies.
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I. Introduction
As traditional sources of credit have become scarcer, more and
more Americans are turning to alternative financial service
providers when they need or want money.1 Some of these fringe
banking firms take personal property as collateral for high-interest
loans, while others tie small-dollar loan amounts to the borrower’s
next paycheck. Another common fringe banking transaction, the
1. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY
UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 10 (2009), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/executive_summary.pdf
(finding
that
25.6% of U.S. households are unbanked or underbanked) [hereinafter FDIC
SURVEY].
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auto-title loan, is a source of credit for millions of Americans but
has not generated the same scholarly interest as pawn and payday
loans.
In an auto-title loan, a borrower typically takes out a onemonth loan at a high interest rate and gives a security interest to
the lender in a vehicle that has no other liens on it.2 If the
borrower defaults on the loan, the lender has the right to repossess
and sell the collateral. It is not surprising that this transaction
creates concern among policymakers because it involves people
who are outside of the mainstream banking system, risking what
is potentially their most valuable asset and their only means of
transportation.
Despite the important concerns that title lending raises, little
empirical work has been done to understand the central questions
policymakers need answered in order to craft optimal title lending
laws.3 Additionally, states regulate title loans through many
diverse approaches, but there are few legal analyses of the
different mechanisms states use to govern title loans.
This Article hopes to contribute to the research on title loans
by tackling these two issues. First, in Part II, I offer new empirical
evidence about the title lending transaction, paying special
attention to the risks borrowers face when they use their vehicles
as collateral for the loan. I gathered this evidence by obtaining new
reports from state regulators about the title lending industry,
examining public disclosure statements by title lenders,
interviewing title lenders, and surveying a small group of title
lending customers.
Second, I organize the different legal responses to title lending
in Part III, creating a taxonomy of regulatory approaches. States
govern title loans by banning them, permitting them to operate
despite usury limits through legal carve-outs such as pawnshop
laws, and explicitly authorizing and regulating them through
statutes geared directly at title lenders.

2. See infra Part II.B.
3. Only two law review articles extensively take up the question of title
lending. See Todd Zywicki, Consumer Use and Government Regulation of Title
Pledge Lending, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 425, 426 (2010); Nathalie Martin &
Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and Demographic
Realities in Title Lending, 77 MO. L. REV. 41 (forthcoming 2012).
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In light of the business realities of title lending and current
regulatory strategies, Part III argues that the best approach to
regulating title lending is for states to adopt laws specifically
aimed at authorizing and regulating title loans. I offer several
tentative suggestions for laws that are particularly important to
protect consumers using title loans. For example, I urge states to
adopt laws that require lenders to return surpluses from sales of
collateral but restrict lenders from pursuing deficiencies. Also, I
suggest laws that require plain disclosures of the cost of title loans
and the risks of repossession and costly rollovers. In contrast, I
find that laws aimed at setting limits on the amount a lender can
loan or capping the amount a lender can charge as an interest rate
likely harm the customers who are most vulnerable to injury from
title lending. The main policy goal underlying many of my
suggestions is to encourage lenders to offer higher loan amounts in
exchange for the collateral pledged, thus protecting those
borrowers who lose vehicles through repossession and risk losing
the equity they have accumulated in their cars. The suggestions
are tentative because many of the important empirical questions
about title lending still require research.
II. The Title Lending Business
Many of the questions at the heart of the debate over title
lending policy are empirical. This Part introduces new data about
these pivotal issues. After discussing my research approach, I
introduce new evidence about the transaction itself and the use of
vehicles as collateral.
A. Research Approach
To gather new information on the title lending industry, I first
collected and compiled data from state regulators who obtain
information from title lenders pursuant to licensing laws. Some of
these state reports are publicly available. The reports from
Tennessee have been discussed in the past,4 but I also discovered
4. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 3, at 434 (discussing the size of title loans
across the country); Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 68.
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public reports from Virginia and Oregon, which have been
overlooked in prior research. In addition to these publicly available
reports, I obtained reports from Illinois through a request under
the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, and from Montana and
Idaho through informal requests to the individuals responsible for
generating those states’ reports.5
Second, I reviewed public disclosure filings by title lenders.
Although there are few public companies doing title lending, I
examined the bankruptcy filings and security re-characterization
filings of TitleMax, one of the nation’s largest lenders, and also
reviewed another public firm’s annual report.
Third, I interviewed title lenders. I spoke with lenders from a
variety of types of businesses—large lenders who do only title
loans, large multi-line lenders, and small lenders. These
interviews were conducted in person or over the phone.
Finally, I attempted to survey title loan customers. I designed
a survey instrument, reproduced in Appendix A, and trained two
research assistants in administering the survey. These two
research assistants spent more than fifty hours waiting for
customers to enter stores at title lending locations throughout
Houston, Texas. The research assistants varied the times and days
of the week that they were at stores.
When customers exited the title lending store, the research
assistants approached them, explained the survey, and offered a
$10 Target gift card as a thank you for completing the survey.
Everyone approached was given an informed consent handout, and
the study was approved by the University of Houston’s Committee
for the Protection of Human Subjects. The response rate was
64.82%, but overall only thirty-five people completed the survey.
Several things prevented a larger number of customers from
participating in the survey. Importantly, most stores did not have
many customers come in each day. Some stores had only one or
two people over a three-hour time period. Others had no customers
during a three-hour period. Additionally, it was difficult to
determine when the stores would be busy because, unlike payday
5. New Mexico also produces a report about title lending, but Martin and
Adams present this data in extensive detail so I do not discuss it here other than
to highlight my different interpretations of those reports. See generally Martin
& Adams, supra note 3.
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loans that are tied to a pay period,6 title loans can be originated on
any day of the month. We had the most success at a single store,
Lone Star Title Loans, simply because it was a much busier store
than any other location. A full 85.71% of the completed surveys
came from this location, while the others came from a variety of
other stores across Houston.7
The survey results are obviously not representative of title
lending customers generally, title lending customers in Texas, or
even those in Houston. And, even if the results were
representative, the sample size is problematically small. Thus, I
present the information I obtained from the surveys merely as
anecdotal evidence about title-lending customers, and I hope
lessons learned from this survey attempt can inform future
customer-based research about title lending. My only claim about
the survey is that it represents the actual people we surveyed.
B. The Title Loan Transaction
Some of the important policy questions surrounding title
lending relate to the transaction itself. In the traditional version of
the product, title loans are one-month long loans, with the entire
balance—principal and interest—due at the end of the month.8 If
the borrower cannot pay the principal, the lender will allow an
interest-only payment to roll the loan over for another month.9
6. Nathalie Martin surveyed payday lending customers using the same
approach with more success by waiting outside stores on Fridays. She obtained
results from 109 people. See Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While
Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV.
563, 597 (2010).
7. See JIM HAWKINS, SURVEY REPORT ON AUTO TITLE LENDING [hereinafter
HAWKINS SURVEY] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 164–65
(2004) (discussing the title loan process).
9. See Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer
Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and its Challenge
to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L.
REV. 589, 598–600 (2000) (“Because auto-title loans routinely require repayment
soon after the transaction is completed, many customers cannot make the full
principal and interest payment when it comes due. As a result, the loan is often
extended for another fee (some contracts allow the lender to do so
unilaterally).”).
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To obtain the loan, the lender usually requires the borrower to
bring a clear title to the vehicle, the actual vehicle, identification,
names of references, and sometimes proof of income.10 In a process
that takes twenty to forty minutes, the lender evaluates the value
of the vehicle, often through the use of commercial guides or
proprietary software.11
1. Why Do People Take out Title Loans?
The reasons people use title loans have enormous policy
implications. If a significant percentage of title loans fuel small
business growth, banning the transaction could hamper job
creation in the midst of a recession. Also, if title loans allow lower
income Americans to overcome emergency situations like
unexpected medical expenses or car repairs, they serve an
important social function. However, a trenchant argument against
title lending has been that it only delays inevitable financial
breakdowns because people use the loan to pay for normal
expenses.12 As it turns out, there is evidence of each of these uses:
business expenses, emergency expenses, and normal expenses.
A couple of studies have documented the reasons people take
out title loans. An FDIC survey of unbanked and underbanked
households asked individuals about why they use fringe credit
products, including pawn loans, payday loans, and rent-to-own.13
Although it did not ask about title loans, the results are still
relevant because the customer base is similar. The FDIC found
that 38% of people used credit from alternative financial service
providers for basic living expenses, 15.4% used it to make up for
10. For one example of these requirements, see Advantage Finance, LLC,
Application For Title Loan in Houston, TX, http://www.cartitleloans
houston.com/pages/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (discussing criteria the
company will consider in assessing loan applications) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See TMX Finance, LLC (Form S-4) (Apr. 19, 2011) at 29 (discussing
valuation formulae using the Black Book) [hereinafter TMX Finance]; id. at 43
(noting the average time to complete a loan transaction).
12. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 9, at 599 (observing that title lending
“can create a ‘debt treadmill’ or downward spiral effect that is at the root of
much of the concern about cash lending in the fringe market”).
13. See FDIC SURVEY, supra note 1, at 42 (providing empirical evidence for
the reasons consumers use fringe credit products).
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lost income, 7.4% used it for house repairs or purchasing an
appliance, 6.2% used it for special gifts or luxuries, 4.5% used it for
car repairs, 2.3% used it for medical expenses, and 26.3% used it
for other reasons.14
I did uncover one survey specifically aimed at title lending
customers, prepared by a large title lender who provided it to me
on condition of anonymity. In 2007, the lender’s customers in New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Kansas, Virginia, and Oregon completed
surveys in conjunction with taking out loans.15 The lender gave
participants a $20 loan coupon in exchange for completing the
survey. The lender compiled the data by state into a report.16 In
Table 1, I aggregate that data and summarize the results when the
lender asked what the “[n]eed for loan was caused by.”
Table 1: Title Lender Survey on Reasons Customers Took Out
Loan
Reason
Car maintenance/repair
Unusually high utility bill
Help with mortgage/rent
Unexpected medical emergency
Delay in payment of expected
income/missed paycheck
Other

Percentage of
Borrowers17
29.18%
19.33%
28.90%
14.87%

Number
314
208
311
160

29.55%

318

8.74%

94

These lists of reasons include both emergency expenses
(roughly 14.2%–29.6% in the FDIC’s survey18 and 92.93% in the
14. Id.
15. See ANONYMOUS LENDER SURVEY 1 (2007) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review) [hereinafter LENDER SURVEY].
16. I obviously am taking this data at face value. I was not involved in
designing or administering the survey, so I do not have information about its
research design, how it was conducted, or the response rate, beyond the details I
have presented here.
17. To calculate the percentage of borrowers citing a reason, I added up all
of the responses to another question about the borrower’s occupation and
divided the reason for the loan by that number. The number of responses to the
question about what need led to the loan was 1,405, but the total number of
people providing an occupation was 1,076. Thus, it appears that some people
listed multiple reasons for needing the loan, which explains why my percentages
add up to more than 100%.
18. These numbers represent those stating their reasons as “house
repairs,” “car repairs,” and “medical expenses” (equaling 14.2%) plus those
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lender’s survey19) and regular expenses (roughly 38% in the FDIC’s
survey20 and 28.09% in the lender’s survey21). Thus, the policy
question is more difficult than just labeling the use of title loans as
either purely emergency or purely routine spending. It appears to
involve both.
Another factor complicating any analysis of loan use is that
people may report that they used the loan for one purpose when
they in fact used it as spending money for other purposes. For
instance, someone may claim to be using a loan to pay rent, but the
person may only need the money because of gambling losses from
earlier in the month. Without a comprehensive budget, survey
data about loan use is difficult to assess.
A similar ambiguity exists about whether a significant portion
of loans is taken out for business reasons. Todd Zywicki reports
from his interviews with industry members that title loans help
small business owners who do not have ready access to traditional
sources of credit and who plan to repay the debt quickly.22 Zywicki
estimates that 25% to 30% of title lending customers fit into this
category.23 People within the industry confirm that many title loan
customers are small business owners who use their vehicles as a
source of capital to operate their businesses.24 TitleMax’s securities
stating their reason was “lost income” (15.4%), depending on whether one
considers this to be an emergency expense or not. See FDIC SURVEY, supra note
1, at 43, 67 (compiling survey responses into Table A-20: Reasons Underbanked
Households Use AFS Credit).
19. This number represents those stating their reasons as “car
maintenance/repair,” “unusually high utility bill,” “unexpected medical
emergency,” or “delay in payment of expected income/missed paycheck.” See
LENDER SURVEY , supra note 15.
20. This number represents those stating that they needed the loan for
“basic living expenses.” See FDIC SURVEY, supra note 1, at 43, 67.
21. This number represents those stating that they needed the loan for
“help with mortgage/rent.” LENDER SURVEY, supra note 15, at 1.
22. See Zywicki, supra note 3, at 449 (“Many such businesses do not have
access to small business loans and rely on consumer credit, such as credit cards,
home equity loans, auto title loans, and other sources of consumer lending to
finance their business operations.”).
23. Id.
24. See Interview with Anonymous Director of Government Affairs, Large
Title Lending Company (Dec. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Anonymous Interview]
(noting that the company only makes consumer loans but that “a significant
percentage of our customer base owns their own business”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Interview with Tommy Davis,
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filing states that customers are often “self-employed small
business owners with an immediate need for short-term working
capital.”25 Even a member of Congress has claimed that title loans
can help save small businesses from failing.26
In the anonymous title lender survey, 19.70% (n = 212) of
customers identified themselves as self-employed.27 The lender,
however, did not ask customers whether the loan was for businessrelated or personal needs, so it is not clear whether these selfemployed customers were using the loan for business purposes. In
listing the need that prompted the loan, very few customers listed
expenses that look like business expenses. Four responses in the
“Other Reasons” category were explicitly business-related:
“Starting a new business,” “Down payment for new work truck,”
“New business,” and “Purchase of Semi.” Additionally, other
categories could have included business-related reasons, such as
“Car maintenance/repair,” “Unusually high utility bill,” “Help with
mortgage/rent,” and “Delay in payment of expected income/missed
paycheck.”28
In my survey, I asked borrowers whether they were taking out
the title loan for “Business Expenses,” “Personal Expenses,” or a
combination of the two. I clarified that “Personal Expenses” would
include buying gas to get to work. Among those we surveyed,

President & Justin Davis, Vice-President, TJD Financial Services, Inc. (Aug. 24,
2011) [hereinafter Davis & Davis Interview] (estimating that 10% of their loans
are for business purposes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Interview with Thomas Cone, General Manager, Magnolia Title Loans (Sept. 20,
2011) [hereinafter Cone Interview] (estimating that 20% of his company’s loans
are for business purposes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Dena Potter, Va. Car Title Lending Law Takes Effect Friday, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS WEEK (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financial
news/D9IHLNUO1.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“Scott Johnson, a lobbyist for
title lender Community Loans of America, said . . . many borrowers are small
business owners who rely on their vehicle for capitol [sic] in order to run their
businesses.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
25. See TMX Finance, supra note 11, at 40.
26. See 146 CONG. REC. H5179-02 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of
Rep. McCollum) (“This emergency credit can keep a small businessman from
going under, or cover immediate needs at the end of the month.”).
27. See LENDER SURVEY, supra note 15, at 1.
28. Id.
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25.71% (n = 9) said they were using the loan at least in part to run
their own business.29
2. How Much Money Do Stores Lend to Customers?
How much money stores lend to borrowers plays an important
role in several of the policy issues surrounding title lending. One
concern is that title lending causes financial distress in allowing
borrowers to take on excessive debt loads. Another perception is
that title lenders strip equity from borrowers by lending them only
a small percentage of the value of their vehicles. We can measure
how much title lenders give to customers in a variety of ways:
(1) the amount lent in absolute dollars, (2) the amount lent relative
to the value of the vehicle, or (3) the amount lent relative to the
borrower’s income. This section evaluates the data for each of these
three measurements.
a. Absolute Dollar Amounts
There are several data points that reveal how much, in
absolute dollars, title loan companies lend to customers. An
earlier academic study reports that the average advance is
$275.30 EZCORP, a public company that does title lending, states
in its annual report that $700 is its average loan amount;31
TitleMax states in a securities filing that “[o]ur customers borrow
on average approximately $1,100 and $850 at our TitleMax and
TitleBucks stores, respectively”;32 and one smaller Texas-based
firm reported its average loan was for $1,000.33 State regulators
report averages of $793.80 in Illinois,34 $562 in Montana,35 $847
29.
30.

See HAWKINS SURVEY, supra note 7, at 1.
See JOHN P. CASKEY, LOWER INCOME AMERICANS, HIGHER COST
FINANCIAL SERVICES 46 (1997).
31. See EZCORP, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (Dec. 14, 2009)
[hereinafter EZCORP, Inc.].
32. See TMX Finance, supra note 11, at 41.
33. See Davis & Davis Interview, supra note 24, at 1.
34. See ILL. DEPT. OF FIN. & PROF. REG., PAYDAY LOAN CONSUMER REPORTING
SERVICE, TITLE LOAN AGGREGATE DATA: OCTOBER 2009 THROUGH JUNE 2011 2
[hereinafter ILLINOIS REPORT] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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in Virginia,36 and $243 in Oregon.37 The modal amount of a title
loan (representing 40% of agreements) in Tennessee was $251–
$500.38
Each of these data points reflects the laws in the jurisdictions
reporting them. Oregon, for instance, limits lenders to charging an
annual percentage rate (APR) of 36% but allows them to charge a
one-time fee of $30, which appears to cause lenders to lend close to
$300.39 Tennessee caps loans at $2,500,40 resulting in lower
averages. I do not have data from California, but we would expect
much higher loan averages there because lenders lend more than
$2,500 to avoid usury limits.41 Thus, not only is a national average
impossible, it is meaningless without the context of the state’s
laws.
While we may not be able to fix an exact amount as the
standard title loan, the data does suggest that title loans are
generally for small amounts. Martin and Adams have argued,
however, that title “loans are by no means small.”42 As evidence,
they point out that “[o]ne internet company offers loans of up to
$50,000, and the New Mexico state data reflect loans up to
Review).
35. See MONT. DIV. OF BANKING & FIN. INSTS., COMPOSITE REPORT OF
OPERATIONS OF MONTANA TITLE LOAN LICENSEES: CALENDAR YEAR 2009 1
[hereinafter 2009 MONTANA REPORT] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
36. See VA. STATE CORP. COMM., BUREAU OF FIN. INSTS., THE 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE PAYDAY LENDER LICENSEES, CHECK CASHERS, MOTOR VEHICLE
TITLE LENDER LICENSEES 84, available at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/bfi/annual/
ar04-10.pdf [hereinafter VIRGINIA REPORT].
37. See OR. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AND BUS. SERVS., DIV. OF FIN. AND CORP.
SEC., OREGON LICENSED CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES 2 (2009), available at
http://www.cbs.state.or.us/external/dfcs/cf/annual_reports/2009.pdf [hereinafter
2009 OREGON REPORT].
38. See TENN. DEP’T OF FIN. INST., 2010 REPORT ON THE TITLE PLEDGE
INDUSTRY 6, available at http://www.tennessee.gov/tdfi/compliance/tpl/TPL
Report2009Final.pdf [hereinafter 2010 TENN. REPORT].
39. See OR. REV. STAT. § 725.622(1) (2007), repealed by Or. Laws Spec.
Sess., ch. 23, § 34 (2010) (maintaining the 36% interest rate and allowing a onetime fee for a new loan).
40. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-15-115(3) (2005) (setting limitations on title
lenders).
41. See CAL FIN. CODE § 22303 (1995) (making interest rate restrictions
inapplicable to any “bona fide principal amount” of $2,500 or more).
42. Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 48 n.37.
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$42,000.”43 These single examples are hardly representative and,
thus, provide poor evidence of what standard amounts may be.
Aggregate data from Montana, for instance, indicates that only
0.42% of loans in 2009 were for more than $4,000,44 while 97.41%
of loans were for less than $2,000.45 In Tennessee, in 2008, “only
3% were made for amounts between $2,251 and $2,500 which is
the maximum loan amount permitted by law.”46 Thus, while it is
difficult to make generalizations, it appears that title loans are
often for low amounts.
b. Money Lent Relative to the Value of the Vehicle
In addition to measuring the absolute amount of title loans,
we can also measure the amount lent in relation to the value of the
vehicle. Again, different sources cite very different ratios, ranging
from “about 25% of the wholesale value of the car”47 to 80% of the
value of the vehicle.48
Similarly, lenders I interviewed gave me a range of
percentages for how much they will lend. One said it typically
lends 50% of the wholesale value of the car;49 another said it lends
33% to 80% of the Black Book50 value of the vehicle depending on
the year and condition of the car;51 and yet another reported that it
43. Id.
44. This represents 53 loans of 12,727. 2009 MONTANA REPORT, supra note
35, at 1.
45. This represents 12,397 of 12,727 loans. Id.
46. 2010 TENN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 6.
47. CASKEY, supra note 30, at 44.
48. See Webinar: Baby, You Can Take My Car: The Dangers of Auto Title
Loans, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (July 15, 2010), http://www.nclc.org/images/
pdf/conferences_and_webinars/auto_webinars/recordings/recording_july15.wmv
(last visited Apr. 8, 2012) [hereinafter NCLC Webinar] (remarks of Leslie
Parrish, Senior Researcher for the Center of Responsible Lending) (reporting
that she has seen loan-to-value ratios of 80%) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
49. Anonymous Interview, supra note 24.
50. The Black Book is a regularly published guide that provides the value
of cars sold at auctions. See Black Book, Overview, http://www.blackbookusa.
com/home.aspx?m=2&s=1&t=D&i=20 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. Interview with Robert Reich, President, Community Loans of America
(Jan. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Reich Interview] (on file with the Washington and
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lends 40% to 70% of the Kelly Bluebook wholesale value of a
vehicle.52 Industry giant TitleMax went through a Chapter 11
bankruptcy recently and, in a disclosure statement sent to
creditors, stated, “Using the appraised value of the Vehicle, and
based upon the customer’s need, the Debtors will lend up to 80% of
the appraised value of a Vehicle.”53 TitleMax’s recent Form S-4
goes into greater detail:
Store managers appraise the wholesale value of the customer’s
vehicle based on the following characteristics of the vehicle:
year, make, model, exterior, interior and mechanical condition
and mileage. One factor our managers consider in determining
asset value is the most conservative wholesale value of the
customer’s automobile listed in the Black Book, as opposed to
the higher retail value listed in the Black Book (for the year
ended December 31, 2010, the “rough” wholesale value amount
was on average 64% less than the retail value amount). This
reduces the overall risk of our title loans receivable by having
more conservative loan to value ratios (at origination, our
receivables had an approximately 69% weighted average loan to
appraised wholesale value and an approximately 25% weighted
average loan to Black Book retail value), which results in more
security for each loan and less overall risk for our company.54

Two puzzles emerge when we consider the relationship
between the vehicle’s value and the loan’s amount. First, it is
difficult to assess whether lenders are giving loans that are “too
high” or “too low.” On the one hand, those concerned with
borrowers’ ability to repay the loans complain that loan amounts
are too high.55 On the other hand, those worried that borrowers
lose equity when title lenders repossess consumers’ vehicles and do
not return the surpluses argue that lenders do not lend sufficiently
Lee Law Review).
52. See Interview with Alex Vaugh, Vice-President of Government
Relations, Cash America, Inc., and Shawn Bourns, Director in Operations
Development of Retail Service, Cash America, Inc. (Nov. 22, 2010) [hereinafter
Vaugh & Bourns Interview] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. Disclosure Statement for Plan of Reorganization of Titlemax Holdings,
L.L.C., at 4–5, In re Titlemax Holdings, L.L.C., 447 B.R. 896 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
2010) (09–40805), ECF No. 390 [hereinafter Titlemax Disclosure Statement].
54. TMX Finance, supra note 11, at 42; see also id. at 29 (“At origination,
our weighted average loan amount is approximately 69% of appraised wholesale
value and approximately 25% of the Black Book retail value.”).
55. See infra Part III.A.1.c.
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high percentages of the vehicles’ value.56 Moreover, research
indicates that higher loan amounts may actually decrease the
likelihood of default.57
The second puzzle that emerges from considering the amount
of the loan in relation to the vehicle is whether title loans are
oversecured or undersecured. The common wisdom is that title
loans are oversecured, or at least fully secured, so lenders are
taking essentially no risk in lending money.58 More pointedly,
members of Congress and others claim that lenders benefit when
they repossess and sell vehicles because they retain the surplus
from the transaction.59 Yet another common charge against title
56. See 146 CONG. REC. H5179-02 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of
Rep. Mascara).
57. See Will Dobbie & Paige Marta Skiba, Information Asymmetries in
Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence from Payday Lending 2 (Vanderbilt Univ.
Sch. of Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 11-05, 2011) (“Our regression
discontinuity estimates suggest that a $100 increase in loan size decreases the
probability that a borrower defaults by 2.8 to 3.8 percentage points. This is a 22
to 35 percent decrease from the mean default rate.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Colleen Creamer, Payday Loans:
Taking the Good with the Bad, 35 NASHVILLE LEDGER 33 (2011) (“I think that
raising the limit actually may be a good thing for borrowers . . . . [W]hen people
are allowed to borrow larger amounts, it actually helps them to repay the loan
rather than renewing it a bunch of times and then eventually defaulting.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
58. See Annesley H. DeGaris, Car Title Lending, 2 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
FOR JUSTICE: AAJ ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 1 (July 2007)
(arguing that high rates “cannot be justified by the amount of risk assumed by
the lender or business-related expenses, as the loans are fully secured and the
lender does not store the pledged item while the debt is outstanding”); see also
Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 41 (“A title loan is a high-interest, deeply
over-secured, consumer loan . . . .”); see also Kristin Arnold, Car Title Lending:
Short-Term Fix with Long-Term Expense, BANKRATE.COM (Nov. 18, 2005),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/auto/car-title-lending-short-term-fix-withlong-term-expense-1.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“The loan-to-value ratio is
rarely greater than 33 percent, making it a win-win situation for the lender if
the borrower defaults.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
59. See 146 CONG. REC. S167-05 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone) (“Someone can take out a $100 loan, and the car might be worth
$2,000, and these companies that we don’t do a darn thing about . . . . You
repossess their car. You sell the car. You don’t even give them back the
additional money you make beyond what they owed you.”); see also 146 CONG.
REC. H5179-02 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Rep. Mascara) (“When
these loans are structured as a title pawn transaction, the title pawn broker
sells the automobile and retains transfer to the pawn broker. The consumer
loses all of his or her equity in the automobile and typically has little or no
recourse to regain the automobile.”); see also DeGaris, supra note 58, at 2
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lenders is that lenders seek deficiencies from borrowers. Martin
and Adams argue that title loans are recourse loans and that
lenders do sometimes seek deficiencies from borrowers.60
So which are they—oversecured or undersecured? The data on
the issue is as muddled as the claims made by opponents of title
lending, seeming to support both sides. Data from state regulators
suggest that either most loans are not oversecured, at least in the
technical sense of that word, or that title lenders are violating the
Uniform Commercial Code on a massive scale. In Tennessee, in
2008, for instance, title lenders returned only $251,047 to
borrowers as surpluses, but they wrote off $13.6 million in
unrecoverable principal.61 While it is possible the unrecovered
principal is partially derived from situations where something
prevented the lender from recovering the vehicle at all, such as
theft or the destruction of the vehicle, the fact that unrecovered
principal was roughly fifty-two times the amount of surpluses
suggests that the loans generally were undersecured.
The notion that lenders repossess vehicles to generate
significant profits is almost certainly wrong. Repossessing, storing,
and selling vehicles are expensive relative to the value of most
pledged vehicles. One operator estimated the costs at around $500
for his company—$250 to pay a company to repossess the vehicle
and $250 to pay for the sale;62 another confirmed that
“[r]epossessions, at best, are a breakeven process and most often
simply mitigate our loss.”63 Tennessee’s report from 2007 found
(“Because . . . [they] are usually over-secured, these lenders face no risk from
default. In fact, consumer advocates argue that title lenders benefit when a
debtor defaults, thus allowing the lender to confiscate and resell the vehicle.”).
60. See Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 32.
61. See 2010 TENN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 8. Other years in Tennessee
are similar. See TENN. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., 2008 REPORT ON THE TITLE PLEDGE
INDUSTRY 7–12, available at http://www.state.tn.us/tdfi/compliance/tpl/TPL
Report2008FinalFinal.pdf [hereinafter 2008 TENN. REPORT] (noting that, in
2006, Tennessee lenders returned $1,256,068 to customers but had $11,394,220
in unrecovered principal); TENN. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., REPORT ON THE TITLE
PLEDGE INDUSTRY: A SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2006 REPORT TO THE TENNESSEE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 7, available at http://www.tn.gov/tdfi/compliance/tpl/2007
TPLSupplementalReport-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter 2006 TENN. REPORT SUPP.]
(reporting that, in 2007, title lenders returned $171,579 to customers but had
$5.1 million in unrecovered principal).
62. Reich Interview, supra note 51, at 1.
63. Anonymous Interview, supra note 24, at 5–6 .
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firms spent, on average, $92.10 for repossession, $72.05 for storing
vehicles until sale, and $4.02 for advertisements.64 These costs do
not include collection costs and legal fees which lenders are
probably entitled to under the title lending contracts. If we assume
these sales generate half the vehicles’ value for the lender, the
lender only makes money on cars that are on the higher end of the
spectrum. As one lender pointed out to me, the proceeds from
interest and fees are much more profitable than the proceeds from
repossession, so lenders have little incentive to repossess cars to
generate revenue.65
Thus, it appears that most loans are not, under the technical
definition of the word, oversecured. But, on the other hand, lenders
rarely seek deficiencies from customers. In Oregon, 0.06% of loans
in 200566 and 0.20% of loans in 200667 resulted in lenders obtaining
a money judgment against a borrower. Lenders68 and even
consumer advocates69 maintain that lenders generally do not
pursue deficiencies even when it is legal to do so.
64. See TENN. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., 2006 REPORT TO THE TENNESSEE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 7–9, available at http://www.tn.gov/tdfi/compliance/tpl/2006
GeneralAssemblyReportTitlePledge.pdf [hereinafter 2006 TENN. REPORT].
65. See Davis & Davis Interview, supra note 24, at 2.
66. See OR. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AND BUS. SERVS., DIV. OF FIN. AND CORP.
SEC., OREGON LICENSED CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES 2005 SHORT-TERM LOANS
2, available at http://cbs.state.or.us/external/dfcs/cf/annual_reports/ 2005.pdf
(reporting that 12 title loan transactions out of 17,801 resulted in the lender
obtaining a money judgment).
67. See OR. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AND BUS. SERVS., DIV. OF FIN. AND CORP.
SEC., OREGON LICENSED CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES 2006 SHORT-TERM
LOANS, available
at
http://cbs.state.or.us/external/dfcs/cf/annual_reports/
2006.pdf [hereinafter 2006 OREGON REPORT] (reporting that lenders obtained
money judgments on only 31 of 15,726 title loans).
68. For instance, although Texas law permits it to seek deficiencies, TDJ
Financial Services never has in its eleven years operating in the state. See Davis
& Davis Interview, supra note 24, at 2. The American Association of Responsible
Auto Lenders (AARAL) also claims its members will not seek deficiencies. See
AARAL, AARAL Best Practices Safeguard Consumers, http://www.responsible
autolenders.org/bestpractices/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2012) (“Repossession of a
consumer’s vehicle is rare and occurs only as a last resort. Should repossession
occur, all proceeds from the sale of the vehicle in excess of the loan balance are
returned to the consumer.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. See NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Jay Speer, Executive
Director, Virginia Poverty Law Center & Sarah Mattson, Policy Director/NH
Health Law Collaborative Director, New Hampshire Legal Assistance) (noting
that, generally, after a title lender repossesses a car, “that is it”).
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Based on this data, a disturbing asymmetry of title lending
emerges. Even though, from the lenders’ perspective, they do not
have much to gain from repossessing a car (because the loans are
not technically oversecured), borrowers have a lot to lose, because
their equity in the vehicle is consumed by the costs of repossession
and resale.70 Regulation needs to account for this lack of
symmetry.
More importantly, the customers at the greatest risk are those
who are probably in the weakest economic position—people with
less valuable vehicles as collateral. If a customer’s car is only
worth $400, but the customer gets a loan for $200 and defaults, the
transaction will almost certainly generate a deficiency because the
customer’s small amount of equity will be quickly used up by
repossession costs. The less expensive the car, the more likely the
lender will be unable to recoup the principal from repossession
alone.
c. Money Lent Relative to Income
Opponents of title lending repeatedly argue that one of the
chief predatory features of title lending is that lenders do not
consider customers’ abilities to repay the loans.71 This argument
70. See Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing
Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2244–45 (1999) (describing this asymmetry as
a common feature in collateralized loans). Mann notes:
[L]enders might take a lien on collateral expecting that the disastrous
losses from repossession and liquidation by the lender would induce
the borrower to repay the loan even if repayment alone is not valueincreasing for the borrower at the time payment comes due. Although
different scholars have different perspectives on the question, some
scholars believe that much of the force of secured credit comes from
the leverage that the lender holds in that transaction: repossession
and liquidation cost the borrower much more than they aid the
lender.
Id. (citation omitted).
71. See, e.g., NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Sarah Mattson)
(asserting that title loans are predatory because they are asset-based and
indifferent to a borrower’s ability to repay); David Ress, Draft Regulations for
Car-Title Loans Draw Lenders’ Fire, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 2009,
at B3 (“Banning car-title loans on cars already being financed ‘would reduce the
opportunity for aggressive lenders to lure borrowers into loans which they are
not capable of repaying,’ the [consumer] group’s lawyer, David W. Clarke,
added.”); Jean Ann Fox & Elizabeth Guy, Driven into Debt: CFA Car Title Loan
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has had traction with policymakers,72 and title loan customers
have sued because title lenders do not consider ability to repay.73
On the other hand, the title lenders assert that they try to
make repayment manageable. The lenders I interviewed all said
that they consider customers’ ability to repay,74 and some lenders’
websites tell customers to bring proof of income, which suggests
they consider ability to repay.75 EZCORP’s annual report tells
Store and Online Survey, CONSUMER FED. OF AM. 2 (2005), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Car_Title_Loan_Report_111705.pdf (“Lenders
don’t run credit checks or base loans on the borrower’s ability to repay. Loans
are generally due in one month, with interest only renewals available.”); Martin
& Adams, supra note 3, at 48 (“[T]he amount of each loan is unrelated to a
person’s income; the amount is based solely upon the value of the vehicle used
as collateral.”).
72. See Press Release, Governor Lynch’s Veto Message Regarding SB 57
(July 6, 2011), http://www.governor.nh.gov/media/news/2011/070611-sb57.htm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Lynch Press Release] (“At the same time,
companies would be allowed to loan without any inquiry into a borrower’s
ability to repay the loan and would even be allowed to loan to people receiving
local welfare assistance.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
73. See Lester v. TitleMax, Inc. (In re TitleMax Holdings, LLC), 447 B.R.
896, 903 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010) (remanding to state Court of Common Pleas).
Before remanding, the bankruptcy court briefly noted the thrust of the suit:
The essential allegations were that the Defendant had violated
South Carolina Consumer Protection Code, S.C. Code Ann. § 37-5108, which provides that if a loan is unconscionable or is induced by
unconscionable conduct the court may strike the entire agreement or
the unconscionable terms within it. Plaintiffs allege that the
unconscionability is evidenced by their belief that the Defendant
knew or should have known that the borrower was unable to make
the scheduled loan payments, and that it had failed to ascertain the
ability to repay through a loan credit check and an evaluation of the
borrower’s debt to income ratio.
Id. at 898 (citations omitted).
74. See Reich Interview, supra note 51, at 2. (stating that his company asks
about income to make sure the customer can pay the monthly installment);
Anonymous Interview, supra note 24, at 2 (“We always consider the customer’s
ability to repay at the time of [the] loan, as we try to ensure that the customer’s
payment obligation to us will be something that fits comfortably into his/her
budget. An applicant must provide information about their monthly income as
well as other indebtedness.”); Davis & Davis Interview, supra note 24, at 1
(emphasizing the central importance the company places on the customer’s
ability to repay); Vaugh & Bourns Interview, supra note 52, at 1 (asserting that
Cash America’s product was designed to ensure that the customer could pay off
the loan).
75. See Auto Cash, USA, Car Title Loan Required Items, http://www.auto
cashusa.com/title-loan-required-items.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“When you

CREDIT ON WHEELS

555

investors that “[l]oan amounts are established based on customers’
income levels, an inspection of the automobile and title and
reference to market values of used automobiles.”76 An industry
trade organization, the American Association of Responsible Auto
Lenders, states on its “Best Practices” webpage that its members
“keep consumers’ payments low enough so they are able to
successfully pay off the loan . . . .”77 Texas-based TJD Financial
Services goes farther than most lenders, by requiring a four-page
application that lists not only income but also all liabilities, so the
lender can ensure that customers can repay their obligations.78
Ultimately, it is impossible to know whether title lenders are
actually evaluating borrowers’ ability to repay, without data from
lenders that show customers’ income, loan amounts, and other
debt obligations. A less direct approach involves looking at
whether people pay off their loans or sacrifice payments to other
creditors to repay their title loans. These questions are taken up in
Parts I.C.1 and I.C.4.
3. Are Title Borrowers Overly Optimistic About Rollovers?
One important concern about title lending is whether
borrowers are overly optimistic when they begin the title loan
transaction about how many times they will roll over or renew the
loan. If borrowers are making poor decisions because they
misjudge their future conditions, regulators could intervene to
correct these errors. Academics make the claim that borrowers do
not understand “the consequences of their lending arrangement.”79
visit one of our licensed vendors’ title loan stores, please bring the following:
Clear Car Title; Driver’s license or state-issued I.D. card; Proof of Income;
Vehicle for an inspection.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
76. EZCORP, Inc., supra note 31, at 6.
77. See AARAL, supra note 68 (“AARAL member companies keep
consumers’ payments low enough so they are able to successfully pay off the
loan and get their title back.”).
78. See The Loan Depot, Apply for a Loan, http://www.yourloan
depot.com/apply_for_a_loan.php (last visited Apr. 8`, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
79. Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory Lending, 122 BANKING
L.J. 483, 491 (2005). One news story pointed out that title-lending customers
operate on a “false hope.” Arnold, supra note 58. In the context of payday
lending, however, scholars have expressly stated that borrowers are overly
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The optimism bias is one of the most robustly established
biases in the literature on behavioral economics.80 It would not be
surprising if people are overly optimistic about the likelihood they
will pay off their title loans with few rollovers. Social scientists use
a variety of methods to establish that people are overly optimistic
in specific situations; one method is to ask people about their
expected outcomes in a situation and compare their expected
outcomes to the actual outcomes of people in the same situation.81
In the title lending survey, we asked customers: “How many
months total do you anticipate it taking you to completely pay off
this loan (after all renewals/rollovers)?”82 Since we spoke to people
who were just taking out a loan that day, as well as people who
had been rolling over for some time, I report here only the people
who had just completed taking out a loan or had had it out just one
month, which amounted to eighteen customers. Of those, 33.33%
(n = 6) predicted taking one month to pay off the loan, 27.78% (n =
5) predicted taking 2 months, 22.22% (n = 4) predicted taking 3
months, 11.11% (n = 2) predicted taking 4 months, and 5.56% (n =
1) predicted taking 5 months.83 Because virtually all accounts
suggest higher numbers of rollovers among actual borrowers in
similar situations,84 the people we surveyed were overly optimistic
about the likelihood they would pay off their loan quickly.
optimistic about how many times they will roll over their loans. See, e.g., Oren
Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 44–45
(2008) (“A customer who misestimates her ability to repay the loan in fourteen
days will likely roll the loan over for another fourteen days. Payday lenders
target such customers, amassing 90% of their profits from borrowers who roll
over their loans five or more times during a year.”); Alan White, Behavior and
Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 161–62 (2007) (“The payday lenders, even by
naming their product, actively seek to encourage the consumer’s mistaken idea
that the loan is very short-term and low-cost.”).
80. See, e.g., Ron Harris & Einat Albin, Bankruptcy Policy in Light of
Manipulation in Credit Advertising, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 431, 434 (2006)
(discussing optimism bias in the context of student loans).
81. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship
Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of
Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993) (“Respondents’ predictions for
the permanence of their own marriages and the consequences should they be
divorced were much more optimistic than their perceptions of the likelihood and
effects of divorce for others.”).
82. See HAWKINS SURVEY, supra note 7, at 1.
83. Id.
84. Industry insiders and state regulators report a variety of different
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4. Costs of Title Loans
The high cost of title lending is a central concern of
policymakers, judges, opponents of title lending, and anyone
attempting to understand how to regulate the product.85
Information about the average of title loan interest rates is
frequently reported. Jean Ann Fox and Elizabeth Guy report a
median rate of “25 percent per month finance charge, which
translates to 300 percent annual interest, plus $25 per loan.”86
Without a doubt, interest rates are high.
Members of Congress have expressed concern that title
borrowers “are unaware of applicable rates,”87 but one study of title
lending argues that title loans “have highly transparent and easily
understood pricing schemes.”88 The people we surveyed did not
exhibit an understanding of the high relative cost of title loans
compared to credit card debt. Only 25.71% (n = 9) recognized that a
title loan is a lot more expensive than credit card debt, while
17.14% (n = 6) thought a title loan is a lot less expensive than
credit card debt. 5.71% (n = 2) thought a title loan was a little less
expensive than credit card debt, and 31.43% (n = 11) thought the
two were about the same cost.89 While this small sample of people
may not be indicative of borrowers generally, it is disturbing how
few people understood the relative cost of their title loan.
lengths of payoff time. See, e.g., 2008 TENN. REPORT, supra note 61, at 6
(reporting seven rollovers on average in Tennessee); NCLC Webinar, supra note
48 (recounting the TitleMax CEO’s observation that customers renew eight
times on average); AARAL, supra note 68 (“Most loans are paid back in six
months or less.”). But see Anonymous Interview, supra note 24, at 3 (“Most
customers have paid off their loan within 90 days.”).
85. See, e.g., Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155,
179 (Wis. 2006) (Butler, J., concurring) (“Predatory lenders exploit borrowers
through excessively high interest rates.”); TMX Finance, supra note 11, at 21
(“The consumer advocacy groups and media reports generally focus on the cost
to a consumer for this type of loan . . . .”); Lynch Press Release, supra note 72 (“I
am vetoing this legislation [which would raise the interest rate above 36% for
title loans] because legalizing excessive interest rates for title loans—rates of
300 percent APR—would be detrimental to our families, our communities, and
to our economy.”).
86. Fox & Guy, supra note 71, at 2.
87. H.R. Con. Res. 312, 106th Cong. (2000).
88. Zywicki, supra note 3, at 437.
89. See HAWKINS SURVEY, supra note 7.
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While customers might not understand the cost of title loans
relative to credit cards, it appears firms do compete for business
based on price. It is often repeated that fringe banking companies
compete on nonfinancial bases such as convenience and
friendliness.90 Title lenders themselves note the important role
nonfinancial issues such as staffing, location, and the cleanliness of
facilities play in capturing business.91 Some academics go further
to claim that there is virtually no price competition in fringe
lending markets like payday lending.92
The truism that borrowers are insensitive to price, however,
does not appear to apply to title lending because price seems to
play a key role in obtaining business. TitleMax publicly disclosed
to its creditors that its success is due in part to the fact it
“charge[s] as much as fifty percent (50%) below the interest rates
charged by its competitors.”93 Similarly, EZCORP tells investors
that competitive pricing is a “primary element[] of competition.”94

90. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 3, at 391 (“[N]ontraditional lenders
compete intensely on nonfinancial margins: As noted, they offer longer hours,
provide highly-personalized customer service, and have many more storefronts
than traditional lenders, competing on convenience.”); Robin A. Prager,
Determinants of the Locations of Payday Lenders, Pawnshops and CheckCashing Outlets 15 (Fed. Res. Bd., Div. of Research & Statistics, FEDS Working
Paper No. 2009-33, 2009); available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/
2009/200933/200933pap.pdf (observing that alternative financial service
providers locate near customers based on a variety of sociological factors).
91. See, e.g., Reich Interview, supra note 51, at 5 (noting the importance of
having a visible location and treating customers well); Anonymous Interview,
supra note 24, at 7 (“We rely on television and radio marketing, friendly and
trust-worthy service, [and] attractive locations in accessible parts of town.”);
EZCORP, Inc., supra note 31, at 11 (“We believe that the primary elements of
competition are the quality of customer service and relationship management,
store location and the ability to loan competitive amounts at competitive
rates.”); Titlemax Disclosure Statement, supra note 53, at 5 (“The success of the
Debtors’ business is attributable to several factors including, but not limited
to . . . employ[ing] a highly-motivated and well-trained sales force that
accurately judge [sic] the appropriate amount of the Customer Loan [and] the
Debtors have highly visible locations and brand recognition.”).
92. See ROBERT MAYER, QUICK CASH: THE STORY OF THE LOAN SHARK 54–56
(2010) (attributing the lack of competition in fringe lending to “information
failure,” due to lenders’ concealment of charges and borrowers’ failure to search
for the lowest prices).
93. Titlemax Disclosure Statement, supra note 53, at 5.
94. EZCORP, Inc., supra note 31, at 11.
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Title lenders’ advertisements confirm the importance of price
in competition. Some lenders emphasize cost in their
advertisements: “[Y]ou’re also certain you’re getting the lowest
guaranteed interest rates anywhere in Texas on your car title
loans! To go from a high-interest short period to a low-interest long
period, you can always have your car title loan refinanced with
us.”95 Some companies even make cost comparisons for customers
between themselves and other companies.96
Different companies appear to offer different rates. In
Tennessee, regulators determined that 53% of companies charged
22% a month, the maximum rate allowed by law, while the other
47% of companies charged between 10% and 21% a month.97 In
Oregon, in 2006, before interest rates were capped at 36%, the
maximum rate charged was 663%, but the average rate was
318%.98 As a local example, companies in Houston charge rates
ranging from 217.7%,99 to 144.95%,100 to 114.0%.101

95. Sugar
Land
Car
Title
Loans,
http://www.sugarlandtitle
loans.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see also Magnolia Loans & Insurance, Title Loan FAQs,
http://www.magnolia-loans.com/faqs/title-loan-faqs/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012)
(advertising its ability to offer cheaper loans than its competitors because
Magnolia has “fewer expenses” and is “honest and straightforward and
believe[s] in making quality loans that people can afford to pay back”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
96. See, e.g., Advantage Finance, Houston Car Title Loans From Advantage
Finance LLC, http://www.cartitleloanshouston.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012)
(comparing itself to two other types of title loan products) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
97. 2010 TENN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 10–11.
98. 2006 OREGON REPORT, supra note 67, at 1.
99. See Texas Title Loans, http://txtitleloans.net/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012)
(comparing its rates to those of competitors with an amortization table) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
100. EZCORP has a store at 8502 Main St. #D, Houston, Texas that, on
September 1, 2011, was publicly advertising title loans at “12%” (per month,
presumably).
101. See Advantage Finance, Houston Car Title Loans From Advantage
Finance LLC, http://www.cartitleloanshouston.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012)
(comparing its rates to those of competitors with an amortization table) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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C. Cars as Collateral

The central objection to title lending relates to the use of the
consumer’s vehicle as collateral for the loan. This subpart explores
some of the factual issues underlying this objection.
1. How Often Do Lenders Repossess Vehicles?
There is a lot of questionable or unclear data about how often
title lenders repossess cars. Many sources, including members of
Congress,102 assert without offering any proof that lenders “often”
repossess people’s cars.103 Even some of those interpreting evidence
about repossessions have reported misguided information about
how often lenders repossess vehicles.
For instance, in a 2007 law review article, Jean Ann Fox
claims, based on reports generated by Tennessee’s Department of
Financial Institutions, that from 35% to over 50% of loans in
Tennessee result in the title lender repossessing the vehicle.104 To
come up with this figure, she took the total number of title loan
agreements reported in Tennessee and divided it by the number of
times customers roll over or renew the loans on average. She
compared that figure to the number of repossessions and concluded
that the repossession rate is between 35% and 50%, depending on

102. See 146 CONG. REC. 12,524 (2000) (“At such a high interest rate, many
of these [title loan] borrowers are unable to pay off their loan and their vehicles
are repossessed.” (emphasis added)).
103. See, e.g., DeGaris, supra note 58, at 2 (“A title loan often ends in
repossession.” (emphasis added)); Arnold, supra note 58 (“Fox [of the CFA] . . .
says . . . , ‘They purposely target borrowers who cannot afford the high-cost,
short-term balloon loans, virtually guaranteeing that many of the loans will
fail . . . .’” (emphasis added)); Newest Form of Predatory Lending Strikes, NEWS
& ADVANCE (Lynchburg, VA), Dec. 10, 2008, http://www2.newsadvance.com/
news/2008/dec/10/newest_form_of_predatory_lending_strikes-ar-220374/
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“Another consequence of car title loans is a high
repossession rate.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Silverman, supra note 79, at 491 (“In cases of default, lenders are quick to
repossess and sell the car . . . .”).
104. See Jean Ann Fox, Fringe Bankers: Economic Predators or New
Financial Services Model?, 30 W. NEW ENGL. L. REV. 135, 140 (2007)
(“Consumers who pledge car titles as security for small loans run the risk of
losing their vehicle.”).
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whether we assume borrowers roll over their loans three or seven
times.105
The problem with this analysis is that the Department of
Financial Institutions considers the “total number of title loan
agreements” to mean only new agreements, not renewals or
rollovers. Although later reports make it explicit,106 the report Fox
was using is unclear on this point, so her confusion is
understandable.107 The employee responsible for creating the
report in Tennessee, however, confirmed to me that the number of
agreements did not include rollovers in that report either.108 Thus,
in determining the repossession rate, we should not divide the
number of loans by the average rollovers. Fox’s repossession rates
are inflated three to seven times the real amount.
Similarly, an influential report from the Woodstock Institute
finds 18% of title loans in Illinois end in repossession.109 The actual
repossession rate is higher, the report argues, because this figure
does not include “repossessions that occur immediately after
default where a court case is not filed by the lender.”110 The
problem, however, is that this repossession rate is not calculated
based on all the title loans in Illinois but merely reflects the
repossession rate in cases where the lender sued to collect money
105. Id. Fox notes:
Tennessee regulators reported that 10,933 vehicles were repossessed
for nonpayment in 2005 out of a total 92,489 loan agreements. If
every Tennessee borrower renews a loan just three times, that is a
35% repossession rate. If every loan is renewed seven times, as
indicated by an earlier Tennessee Department of Financial
Institutions report, more than half of the cars pledged for loans are
eventually lost by borrowers.
Id.
106. The report generated in 2008 concerning data from 2006 explicitly
states that the “total number of [title pledge] agreements” “reflects new
agreements made and does not include renewals of these initial agreements.”
2008 TENN. REPORT, supra note 61, at 4.
107. See 2006 TENN. REPORT SUPP., supra note 61, at 7 (stating the total title
pledge agreement figure without explaining whether it incorporates rollovers
into that figure or not).
108. E-mail from Steve Henley, Tenn. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., to Jim Hawkins
(Aug. 4, 2011, 14:33 CST) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
109. See WOODSTOCK INST. & PUB. ACTION FOUND., DEBT DETOUR: THE
AUTOMOBILE TITLE LENDING INDUSTRY IN ILLINOIS 5 (2007).
110. Id.
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from the borrower.111 Cases in collection likely have a different
repossession rate than cases outside collection. Moreover, cases
with loans that have sufficiently high values to encourage a suit
likely have different repossession rates than the general
population of title loans. Thus, the Woodstock Institute report does
not provide any evidence of the repossession rate for all title loan
agreements.
Nathalie Martin and Ozymandias Adams state in a new
paper, based on reports from New Mexico, that “between 20% and
71% of the title loan customers have their vehicles repossessed.”112
Martin and Adams’s calculations rely on the summary data in the
New Mexico reports, and they use this data to calculate various
averages. Important here, they calculate the average amount of
each loan by comparing the total principal for all loans originated
during the calendar year to the total principal amount outstanding
on all loans at the end of the calendar year.113 They calculate the
number of loans per year (a number omitted from the New Mexico
report but present in almost all other state reports) by dividing the
total amount of principal by the average loan amount.114 Finally,
they use the average times a person took out a new title loan that
the state generates.
To calculate how often people lose their vehicles, Martin and
Adams divide the total number of loans (a figure generated
through computing the average size of each loan) by the average
number of times a person took out a new loan. Then, they divide
the quotient by the number of repossessions in the year.115
Beginning with such estimated data leads to two fundamental
computational problems. First, as Martin and Adams note, “[o]ne
problem with the yearly summaries is that they average all of the
data, including obvious outliers.”116 This introduces some unknown
111. See id. at 2 (explaining that the statistics generated in the report are
based on an analysis of cases filed against title borrowers).
112. Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 45. In another article, Martin
suggests that one-third of borrowers lose their cars. See Nathalie Martin,
Regulating Payday Loans: Why This Should Make the CFPB’s Short List, 2
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1446 (2011), available at http://www.hblr.org/wpcontent/uploads/ 2011/07/Martin-Payday-Loans.pdf.
113. Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at tbl.4.
114. Id. at 80.
115. Id. at 64.
116. Id.
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error rate into each original average. Once two such averages are
combined to perform a calculation, the error rate is compounded.
Second, Martin and Adams perform their computations under
the assumption that dividing the averages of two variables results
in a third average—the average of the divided variables. This is
not true.117 As a result of beginning with averaged data, Martin
and Adams have no choice but to reverse the correct order of
arithmetic in averaging, resulting in potentially skewed final
numbers.
Finally, Todd Zywicki finds that around 8% of loans lead to
repossession based on state reports and interviews with title
lending companies.118 Based on his discussion of this repossession
rate, however, it is unclear if Zywicki is reporting the number of
new title loan agreements that led to repossession or the number
of renewals or rollovers that led to repossession.119 Based on the
data I report below, it appears that Zywicki is reporting
repossessions per new loan agreement, but it is not entirely clear.
To attempt to understand how often customers lose their
vehicles, I interviewed title lenders and evaluated reports
generated by state regulators. One title lender informed me that
its database tracks repossession rates per customer,120 and that 5%
to 6% of customers lose their vehicles.121 News stories report the
nation’s largest lender stating that the repossession rate per
117. For instance, say Variable A has data points {1, 3, 5} and Variable B
has data points {2, 4, 6}. The average of Variable A is 3 and the average of
Variable B is 4. Thus (the average of Variable A) divided by (the average of
Variable B) is 3/4 or 27/36. This is not the same as the average of (Variable A
divided by Variable B). (Variable A divided by Variable B) results in the set {1/2,
3/4, 5/6} with an average of 25/36. The former method is the one employed by
Martin and Adams, while the latter is the more mathematically sound.
118. See Zywicki, supra note 3, at 435.
119. See Adam Levitin, Auto Title Lending Data, CREDIT SLIPS (Jan. 14,
2011 11:50
PM),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/01/auto-titlelending-data.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“[Zywicki’s data] also seemed
highly skewed by the fact they were counting loans rather than borrowers. Title
loans are 30-day loans that can be rolled over, but a roll-over counts as a new
roll, which effectively inflates the denominator for default rates.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
120. Anonymous Interview, supra note 24, at 5.
121. See E-mail from Anonymous Title Lender to Jim Hawkins (Jan. 1,
2011, 15:13 CST) (“Our average national repossession rate is between 5 and 6%.
This is based on a ratio of repossession per customer not loans.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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customer is 7%.122 A smaller operator in Texas told me that they
repossess around 10% of customers vehicles but that customers
redeem the vehicles 6–7% of the time, resulting in 3–4% of people
losing their vehicles.123 Similarly, another Texas lender with two
stores indicated that 7.2% of its loans result in repossession,
meaning roughly 10% of borrowers lost their vehicles.124
I have combined the data from the six states’ reports in Table
2 below. None of the states report how many new loan agreements
a customer takes out on average a year, so it is impossible to know
how many customers lose their vehicles from title lending. But
these figures do not include rollovers or renewals under the
“number of title loans,” so the repossession rates reported below
are rates per new title lending agreement.125
Because some customers take out more than one new loan a
year, the repossession rate per customer could be higher. We do
know, however, that the repossession rate per customer is not
122. See Richard Locker, No Progress on Title-Lending Bill: Coalition,
Industry Pitch Sides, but Panel OKs Nothing, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, July
23, 2008, available at http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2008/jul/23/no-progresson-title-lending-bill/?printer=1/ (“The . . . vice president of Atlanta-based
Community Loans of America . . . said ‘only 7 percent of customers had their
cars seized . . . .’”). For another report not based on repossessions per customer,
see Sue Kirchhoff, Some Consumers Run into Big Problems with Auto Title
Lending, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 2006, available at http://www.usa
today.com/money/perfi/general/2006-12-26-title-loans-usat_x.htm (“Rod Aycox,
president of LoanMax auto title and its affiliated companies throughout the
country, made about half a million loans this year and repossessed cars in 5% of
the cases, or 25,000 autos, according to a statement from his firm.”).
123. Davis & Davis Interview, supra note 24.
124. Cone Interview, supra note 24.
125. I have e-mails from regulators in Tennessee and Montana that confirm
the number of loan agreements does not include rollovers or renewals. See Email from Steve Henley, Tenn. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., to Jim Hawkins (Aug. 4,
2011, 14:33 CST) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); E-mail
from Linda Leffler, Mont. Div. of Banking & Fin. Insts., to Jim Hawkins (Aug. 5,
2011, 16:57 CST) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
Illinois report plainly does not count renewals as different loans because it
states that the average length of time the borrower had a loan was over 300
days, which reflects multiple renewals of a single loan. The Oregon report lists
rollovers separately from total loan agreements, indicating the former does not
include the latter. See 2009 OREGON REPORT, supra note 37, at 2. And, for some
years in Oregon, rollovers were prohibited, so the total number of loans could
not include rollovers. The Virginia report says the average number of days
customers had loans was 305, which indicates the loan number includes
rollovers. See VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 36, at 84.
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much higher than the repossession rate per new loan because the
lengths of loans reported in different states are all quite high. Few
customers could have more than one loan out during the year.
Table 2: Repossession Rates on New Title Loans
State

Year126

Tennessee128

2008
2007
Nov. 2005–June 2006
2004
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2010
Oct. 2009–June 2011
2009
Oct. 2010–Dec. 2010

Oregon129

Idaho130
Illinois131
Montana132
Virginia133

Number of
New Title
Loan
Agreements
161,417
139,319
92,489
250,593
17,820
10,136
8,568
15,726
17,801
34,247
155,094
12,727
24,975

Number of
Repossessions127

Repossession
Rate

14,832
18,199
10,933
17,313
2
1
32
125
114
2382
7,334
599
194134

9.18%
13.06%
11.82%
6.91%
0.01%
0.00%
0.37%
0.80%
0.64%
6.96%
4.73%
4.71%
0.78%

Based on the information in Table 2, the repossession rates in
these six states are much lower than previous research has
indicated.

126. The year noted in Table 2 represents the year the data were gathered,
not the year the data were reported.
127. These figures exclude cases in which customers redeemed repossessed
collateral because in those cases customers did not in fact lose their vehicles.
128. To view these reports, see TENN. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., Title Pledge
Reports, http://www.tn.gov/tdfi/compliance/tpl/TPLreports.html (last visited Apr.
8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
129. To view these reports, see OR. DIV. OF FIN. AND CORP. SEC., Consumer
Finance, Payday, and Title Lending Annual Activity, http://www.cbs.state.or.
us/external/dfcs/activity_reports/consumer_finance.html (last visited Apr. 8,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
130. On file with the Washington and Lee Law Review.
131. On file with the Washington and Lee Law Review.
132. On file with the Washington and Lee Law Review.
133. See generally VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 36.
134. This number likely overstates the number of vehicles consumers lost
because the report states that only two vehicles were sold by lenders, indicating
customers redeemed some repossessed vehicles. Id. at 84.

566

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535 (2012)

2. Are Borrowers Overly Optimistic About the Chances Their
Vehicle Will Be Repossessed?
It is possible that lenders frame the transaction to minimize
customers’ awareness of the potential loss of their vehicles.135
Borrowers might think the risk of losing their car is lower than it
really is, so they undervalue the risk when making the decision
whether to enter into the transaction. Put another way, borrowers
might be “operating on false hopes” regarding whether their car
will be repossessed.136 The facts that borrowers do not have to turn
over their vehicle or even their title to the vehicle in some cases
has led some commentators to theorize that borrowers do not feel
the potential loss at the time of the transaction.137 Legislators have
even argued that title lenders deceive borrowers about the
likelihood their car will be repossessed: “These pay-day loans, title
loans, where you come in and hand the title of your car over and
they give you a basic loan and say: We are not going to take your
car away. The next thing you know, interest rates are going up,
you refinance the loan, and pretty soon you may lose your car.”138
To test whether borrowers are overly optimistic about the
likelihood their car would be repossessed, I asked them, “What do
you think is the percentage chance the lender will repossess your
vehicle?” Unlike my analysis of optimism for rollovers, I include all
responses here, regardless of how long the customer had had the
135. See Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38
AKRON L. REV. 725, 731 (2005) (“[P]redatory lenders go to extreme lengths to
frame their loans as gains and to obscure potential losses.”).
136. Arnold, supra note 58.
137. See Jean Braucher, Theories of Overindebtedness: Interaction of
Structure and Culture, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 332 (2006) (“Title
‘pawn’ loans allow consumers to get non-purchase-money secured auto loans,
without the cautionary event of a transfer of possession but with the risk of
losing a car used to get to work.”); see also Dave Ress, Proposed Regulations for
Car-Title Loans Draw Fire, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 2009, available
at http://www2.timesdispatch.com/business/2009/nov/04/b-payd04_20091103-21
1405-ar-15441/ (“‘A borrower . . . should be fully aware that he has given the
lender a lien on his vehicle and that he may lose his vehicle if he doesn’t
repay . . . . This will not necessarily be clear to the borrower unless he is
required to surrender his title.’” (quoting James W. Speer, executive director of
the Virginia Poverty Law Center) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
138. 156 CONG. REC. S3021 (daily ed. May 3, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
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loan out. 54.29% (n = 19) of those we surveyed predicted a 0%
chance that the lender would repossess their vehicle, 2.86% (n = 1)
predicted a 5% chance, while 40% (n = 14) predicted a 10% or
greater chance their vehicle would be repossessed.139 For
borrowers taking out a loan the date they were surveyed, 75%
(n = 6) predicted a 0% chance they would lose their vehicle.
Regardless of which state’s or lender’s data we use, most of the
people we surveyed exhibited too optimistic a view of whether the
lender would repossess their vehicle.
3. Do Lenders Use Collateral as a Terror Mechanism to Encourage
Repayment?
Even if lenders do not actually repossess borrowers’ vehicles,
some commentary on title lending suggests that the mere threat of
repossession is sufficient to cause borrowers to continue to make
payments on the title loan. More specifically, opponents argue that
using vehicles as collateral causes borrowers to prioritize their title
loan payments over other bills140 and gives lenders substantial
bargaining leverage over borrowers.141 It is not the value of the

139. Four people predicted a 10% chance, one person predicted a 15%
chance, two people predicted a 20% chance, one person predicted a 30% chance,
two people predicted a 50% chance, one person predicted a 70% chance, and two
people mysteriously predicted a 100% chance. Two people did not answer this
question. See HAWKINS SURVEY, supra note 7.
140. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES
DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 7, 44
(2006) [hereinafter DOD REPORT], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/
pdfs/Report_to_Congress_final.pdf (“[Car title pawns] provide undue and
coercive pressure on military borrowers and allow lenders more latitude in
making loans without proper regard for the Service member’s ability to
repay. . . . The use of . . . car titles pressure[s] the borrower to consider loan
payments as being their top priority.”); NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks
of Leslie Parrish) (arguing that title loans cause borrowers to drop their other
bills to make sure they pay on their title loan); Id. (remarks of Jay Speer)
(reporting that two people seeking legal help claimed they would pay down their
title loan before they paid their rent).
141. See DOD REPORT, supra note 140, at 7; see also NCLC Webinar, supra
note 48 (remarks of Sarah Mattson) (asserting that title lenders use the
powerful leverage of repossession over consumers in negotiations to set up
repayment plans).
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vehicle that compels repayment but, instead, the cost of
purchasing a replacement.142
The fact that some lenders in Virginia used to take out a
second lien on a vehicle, which would not allow them to actually
recover anything, provides some evidence of the role terror could
pay in title loan transactions.143 Yet, the value of the vehicle sets
the amount of the loan in most cases. Thus, lenders must not view
the collateral merely as a means of forcing repayment, because
they use it as a baseline for how much to lend.
To test the coercive force of using a vehicle as collateral, I
asked customers, “If you couldn’t pay off all your bills one month,
which bills would you NOT pay so you could pay on this loan?” We
provided various categories of bills. Table 3 reports the results.
Table 3: Bills Borrowers Would Not Pay in Order to Pay Title Loan
Bill
Rent or Mortgage Payment
Utilities
Credit card debt
Groceries
Medical
Other:
Including pet bill, cable bill, internet service,
cellular phone bill

Percentage
5.71%
5.71%
62.86%
11.43%
11.43%
22.86%

Number
2
2
22
4
4
8

Table 3 indicates that the people we surveyed would not
prioritize their title loan payments over their basic necessities such
as rent, utilities, groceries, or medical expenses. The survey does
suggest the people we surveyed prioritize paying the title lender
before their credit card company, but this preference does not
indicate that title borrowers are terrorized into prioritizing their
title loan payments.
4. Do Customers Have Other Transportation to Work?
A central factual question in the policy debates about title
lending is whether people taking out title loans have other means
142. See NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Jay Speer).
143. See id. (asserting that some lenders in Virginia, like Advance America,
do title loans with a second lien on the vehicle to make borrowers think the
lender can take the car and sell it, even though Virginia law does not allow
lenders to take a second lien on a vehicle).
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of transportation. This issue is important because, if title loans
cause people to lose their jobs or fail to show up to doctors’
appointments, it is much easier to link title lending to other social
ills.
It is hard to overstate how important this issue is to
policymakers considering title lending. Consumer advocates make
this argument the center of their strategy against title lending.144
Academic papers145 and press reports146 have also taken up the
theme, reporting the argument that title loans are “more

144. See, e.g., Payday and Title Loans, Hearing Before the Illinois Senate
Fin. Comm. (1999) (statement of Daniel A. Edelman, on behalf of the Illinois
Consumer Justice Council), available at http://www.edcombs.com/CM/News/
news20.asp (“No collateral should be permitted on these high-interest loans.
There is no justification for 200 or 300% fully secured loans. Consumers who
need automobiles to get to work and stay off welfare should not be losing their
cars to ‘title lenders.’”); NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Jessica
Hiemenz) (noting the main concern with auto title lending is the risk of
repossession); Barry Yeoman, Sudden Debt?, AARP THE MAGAZINE, Sep./Oct.
2006, at 129 (“They’re really devastating for elderly people who need their
cars.”); Loans Secured by Car Titles Trap Borrowers in Cycle of Debt, CONSUMER
AFFAIRS (Apr. 18, 2005), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/
car_loans.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (noting that the loans in “many cases”
end in the repossession of the car “after the borrower has made substantial
payments” and that this is “devastating because a car is often the borrower’s
largest asset and his or her only way to get to work”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
145. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 104, at 140 (noting the risk to “vital
transportation”); Braucher, supra note 137, at 332 (pointing out that title loans
expose borrowers to “the risk of losing a car used to get to work”); Barr, supra
note 8, at 166 (“With title lending . . . the borrower risks losing her car, which
may be her regular way to get to work, and to transport children to and from
school or child care.”).
146. See, e.g., Elinat Paz-Frankel, Opponents of Auto Title Lending Industry
Hope Legislature Limits ‘Outrageous’ Fees, MEMPHIS BUS. J., Aug. 22, 2008
(noting that “[c]ars are used as collateral for title loans” and that “when vehicles
are repossessed, borrowers often are left with no means of driving to work”);
Kirchhoff, supra note 122 (“If borrowers can’t pay back the loans, often due in 30
days, they often roll them over, with multiplying fees. If they still fall behind,
their cars can be repossessed. That contributes to a downward spiral, with
people unable to get to work, a doctor or drive their kids to school.”); Newest
Form of Predatory Lending Strikes, supra note 103 (“A lobbyist for . . .
LoanMax . . . said that reducing the rate to 36 percent would effectively put the
company out of business. So be it. Such an alternative is far preferable to
preying on the poor at the ultimate expense of depriving them of their only
means of transportation.”).
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damaging than payday loans because borrowers who cannot pay
the required fees lose their transportation to and from work.”147
Most importantly, government officials have placed
tremendous stock in the argument that people will lose their only
way to get to work. One Congressman asserted that repossessions
by title lenders “often” result in the loss of a job.148 The House of
Representatives itself passed a resolution calling on states to
intervene in title lending markets because “title loans and title
pawns threaten the ability of consumers to hold a job since default
on the loan or pawn will result in repossession and sale of their
car, which is often their only means of transportation to and from
work . . . .”149 The Department of Defense, in its report urging
Congress to take action to prohibit high cost loans to service
members, stated that title loans endanger “essential
transportation.”150 Even judges have expressed concern that if “a
payment is missed, the lender can start the process of taking the
borrower’s vehicle, resulting in a loss of transportation to work and
to obtain health care.”151
Officials’ concerns about the risk of losing transportation have
resulted in real-world consequences. The governor of New
Hampshire recently vetoed a law that would have permitted title
lending in the state because “[f]ailure to repay a loan could lead to
seizure of the family car, which is often essential for family
147. JEFF PETERSON, ARIZ. RURAL POLICY INST., PREDATORY LENDING: PROFILE
ANALYSIS 5 (2007); see also Frank Burt et al., Refund Anticipation, Payday,
and Auto Title Loans: A Survey of Select Fringe Lending Products, JORDEN BURT
LLP, May 2006, at 21, available at http://www.jordenburt.com/attachments/
489.pdf (“Unlike the loss of a television or other electronic good, the loss of a car
because of a default on a loan can have extensive ramifications for a person who
needs the car for work, grocery shopping, care of children, and other daily
necessities.”).
148. 146 CONG. REC. 12,524 (2000) (“As is the case for most Americans, these
consumers depend on their automobiles and trucks for transportation to their
jobs, vital medical appointments, and school for their children. So the loss of a
vehicle through an unfair foreclosure often results in the loss of a job or other
serious consequences.”).
149. H.R. Con. Res. 312, 106th Cong., 146 CONG. REC. 12,523 (2000)
(enacted).
150. DOD REPORT, supra note 140, at 16 (“The high cost and risk of car title
loans traps borrowers in repeated loan renewals in order to keep from losing
essential transportation and key family assets.”).
151. Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 179 (Wis.
2006) (Butler, J., concurring).
AND
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members to maintain employment.”152 Wisconsin Governor Jim
Doyle used his veto power to outlaw title lending in Wisconsin
because “[a]uto title loans can result in individuals losing their
vehicles due to failure to make timely payments on relatively small
loan amounts, putting at high risk an asset that is essential to the
well-being of working families.”153 The most common regulatory
response, as demonstrated in the cases of Wisconsin and New
Hampshire, is to ban title lending. In 2009, a Wisconsin state
legislator supported a ban on title lending because “most folks
need that car for work, family, etc.”154
Yet, despite the frequency of this claim, there is absolutely no
data, except for that generated by the industry discussed below,
about whether people using title loans have more than one vehicle.
Consumer advocates arguing against title loans concede that we
have no information about what vehicles people use to get to
work.155 The one data point that is public is from an internal
survey of TitleMax customers, which found that “[a]pproximately
70% of our customers own two or more vehicles.”156 However,
TitleMax has only released the conclusions of its survey, not any of
the underlying methodology or data. Thus, this central question of
title lending policy remains entirely unaddressed.157
152. Lynch Press Release, supra note 72.
153. Doyle’s Veto Pen Is a Sword for Consumers, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison,
Wis.), May 26, 2010, at 29. For an explanation of how the governor outlawed
title lending through his veto power, see Auto Title Lenders Decry Doyle Veto,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 19, 2010 (“Doyle on Tuesday used his partial veto
power to cross out parts of several sections to create a new sentence declaring,
‘No licensed lender may make a title loan.’”).
154. Press Release, Zepnick Proposes Consumer Lending Reforms, WIS.
POLIT., July 24, 2009, available at http://www.wispolitics.com/1006/090305_
Payday_Lending.pdf.
155. See, e.g., NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Leslie Parrish).
156. TMX Finance, supra note 11, at 43.
157. Another important policy question that needs research is whether most
of the cars that lenders repossess actually work. Title lenders claim that most
vehicles they repossess are essentially worthless. See, e.g., Davis & Davis
Interview, supra note 24 (estimating 90% of the vehicles TDJ Financial
repossesses are worthless); Zywicki, supra note 3, at 455 (“[M]any of these cars
have mechanical failures or other damage that makes it not worthwhile to
expend the cost of repossession.”); Locker, supra note 122 (“[The] vice president
of Atlanta-based Community Loans of America . . . said . . . that some customers
who default have cars so worthless that they tell lenders to come get them.”). It
is important to know whether the repossessed vehicles still function because, if
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In my survey, I asked, “Considering only people living in your
same house, how many working vehicles does your family have?”
Among those we surveyed, 20% (n = 7) had only one vehicle in
their household. The remaining 80% had two or more vehicles,
with the modal number (representing 62.86% of surveys) being two
vehicles. If these results were representative—I do not suggest
they are—and the repossession rates presented in Part II.C.1 were
representative, then the number of people losing their only way to
work is small: around 2%. Because of the limitations on the data I
acquired, this remains a question of central importance for title
lending policy. My findings, however, cast doubt on the oftrepeated claim that title lending results in customers being unable
to get to work.
States have had to craft regulatory policy for title lending
despite the uncertainties that surround the fundamentals of this
business. The next Part explains how different states have
responded to title lending.
III. Title Lending Law
Several well-known federal laws govern title lending. One is
the Truth in Lending Act, which, among other things, requires
that title lenders disclose the cost of loans as an APR.158 Another is
the Talent-Nelson Amendment, which essentially forbids title
loans to members of the armed service.159 More recently, the new
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
forbids lenders from engaging “in any unfair, deceptive, or abusive
act or practice,” and empowers the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection to develop regulations for title lenders.160
most do not, the claim that people are losing a means of transportation is
obviously false. But it is hard to believe that lenders would spend the money to
repossess nonfunctioning cars, suggesting people are losing a means of
transportation.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1664 (2006).
159. 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006).
160. Consumer Financial Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act of 2010 § 1036, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 2010 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5536). For a more
extensive discussion of the importance of the Act for fringe creditors, see Jim
Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 23
(2011).
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Less explored and recognized are state statutes regulating
title lending. States have adopted a wide variety of methods for
regulating title lending. These cover an enormous range, from
banning the transaction to formally authorizing it with very few
restrictions. This Part categorizes current regulatory approaches
and analyzes these disparate schemes and their relationship to
other laws not specifically governing title lending.
Creating categories of different state regulations is significant
because, while other articles have discussed title lending law
generally,161 no other articles have established such a taxonomy of
existing title lending laws. Creating a taxonomy allows us to see
the options available to regulators when confronting the problems
and the opportunities created by title lending. This Part sets the
groundwork for Part IV, which evaluates these different
approaches.
A. Effective Bans
Although federal legislation has been introduced in an
attempt to ban title loans across the nation,162 it is difficult to find
any states that explicitly ban title lending. However, a strong
majority of states effectively ban title lending by setting usury
rates low enough that no one will offer title loans within their
borders. Alaska provides one of many examples.163 Alaska has a
small loan law that applies for any loan under $25,000.164 The
statute caps loans under $25,000 at a maximum of 3% a month,165
which works out to roughly 42.5% APR. No statute in Alaska
161. See Zywicki, supra note 3, at 434–35 (summarizing state laws at a high
level); Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 54–56 (discussing several individual
state statutes without placing them into a broad conceptual framework).
162. A federal ban on auto title lending was introduced by Arizona
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. See Press Release, Rep. Gabrielle Giffords,
U.S. Rep. Gabrielle Giffords Acts to Ban Payday Lending Nationwide (June 30,
2010), available at http://www.votesmart.org/public-statement/526382/us-repgabrielle-giffords-acts-to-ban-payday-lending-nationwide. The text of the bill is
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-5689.
163. For a few other examples, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-201(2)(a)(I) (2010)
(capping loans under $1,000 at 36% APR); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 41a(b)(4)
(West 2011) (capping loans secured by vehicles at 20% APR).
164. ALASKA STAT. §§ 06.20.010–.920 (2010).
165. Id. § 06.20.230(a).
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explicitly exempts title lenders from this cap,166 and Alaska does
not allow title lenders to offer title loans structured as open-ended
credit agreements to evade the cap.167 Thus, if a business wants to
make a title loan, it is subject to the 42.5% APR cap.
Title lenders refuse to offer title loans at 40% APR, so this rate
cap effectively bans title lenders from Alaska and other states with
similar laws. As one example, EZCORP’s annual report explains
that its stores do not lend to active duty military personnel
because the federal government caps the interest rate on such
loans at 36%.168 Evidence from states enacting interest-rate caps
on payday loans after allowing higher rates makes it plain that
lenders will not continue offering loans in these environments.169
One consumer advocate has found that title lenders will generally
only operate if they are permitted to charge above 200% APR.170
Thus, when states enact caps at lower amounts, the effect is a
complete ban.171

166. Alaska does exempt pawnbrokers from this statute, so it is possible
that a business could make a title loan as a pawnbroker for less than $500. See
id. § 06.20.330(b) (“This chapter does not apply to individual loans by
pawnbrokers . . . or loan shops where separate and individual loans do not
exceed $500.”).
167. See id. § 06.20.285(a) (“A licensee may make open-end loans not
exceeding an aggregate total of $25,000 and may contract for and receive
interest on open-end loans as provided in AS 06.20.230 [setting 3% monthly rate
maximums], and for other charges permitted under this chapter.”).
168. See EZCORP, Inc., supra note 31, at 14 (“This 36% annual percentage
rate cap applies to a variety of loan products, including signature loans, though
it does not apply to pawn loans. We do not make signature loans to active duty
military personnel . . . because it is not economically feasible for us to do so at
these rates.”).
169. Zywicki uses a report from Policis, THE EFFECT OF INTEREST RATE
CONTROLS IN OTHER COUNTRIES 16 (Policis 2004), to make the point that after
Florida capped interest rates for title loans at 30%, “the number of auto title
lenders operating in the state dropped from 600 before the legislation was
enacted to 58 the year following.” Zywicki, supra note 3, at 432 n.17.
170. See NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Leslie Parrish).
171. Indeed, a consumer advocate recently pointed out that one of the best
ways to ban title lending is to place a cap on interest rates. See id. (remarks of
Jay Speer).
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B. Title Lenders Operating in States with Strict Price Controls
Despite the fact that interest rate caps should effectively ban
title lenders from offering loans in a state, it is very difficult to
determine whether any given interest rate ceiling is effective in
preventing title lending. The National Consumer Law Center
produced a “Scorecard” on small-dollar loan products in 2010 that
lists which states prohibit title loans or set interest rates below
36%.172 The Scorecard reports that thirty states fall within this
category and should therefore have no title lenders.173 Twenty
states permit rates above 36%, but only seventeen permit rates
above 200%,174 the rate generally required to allow title lending to
exist.175 Yet, the American Association of Responsible Auto
Lenders reports that its members alone operate in twenty-two
states,176 so determining which states effectively ban title lending
is not as simple as merely looking at usury caps.
There are several states that have rate caps that should
prevent title lending but fail to do so because title lenders use
creative legal moves to avoid the rate cap. Lenders have avoided
caps in Kansas by offering loans as open-ended credit
arrangements, in Texas by operating as Credit Service
Organizations, and in California by offering loans at amounts just
above the amount covered by the rate cap. The following sections
explain how these transactions work despite laws that appear to
effectively ban them. In some cases, lenders operate in the midst of
uncertainty, realizing that courts may vitiate their loophole
through a different interpretation of the law enabling their
creative practice.

172. See LEAH A. PUCKETT ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., SMALL DOLLAR
LOAN PRODUCTS SCORECARD—UPDATED 14–20 (May 2010), available at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/cu-smalldollar-scorecard-2010.pdf.
173. Id. at 14–20.
174. Id.
175. See NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Leslie Parrish).
176. Am. Assoc. of Responsible Auto Lenders, About the AARAL,
http://www.responsibleautolenders.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
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1. Open-Ended Credit

Kansas is a state with a 36% interest rate cap,177 but it has
active title lending within its borders.178 To avoid the cap and
operate within Kansas, lenders structure title loans in Kansas as
open-ended credit arrangements. In an open-ended credit plan,
like those used by credit card companies, the lender sets a credit
limit, and the borrower can access any amount of money within
that limit over a period of time, pay it off, and access it again, and
the lender only charges a finance charge on the actual amount
borrowed.179 Title lenders in Kansas structure loans just like credit
cards. One advertisement explains, “The title loan is an open-end
line of credit that can be used as needed and paid back in full at
any time . . . .”180
Unlike normal loans, Kansas exempts open-ended credit from
any cap: “For any consumer loan incurred pursuant to open end
credit, including, without limitation, a loan pursuant to a lender
credit card, a lender may charge a finance charge at any rate
agreed to by the parties . . . .”181 By simply restructuring the
transaction, title lenders obviate the rate cap.
Lenders in Kansas are not alone in this practice. Up until
recently, Virginia’s Finance Act182 had a similar loophole that
resulted in title lenders offering open-ended credit plans.183
177. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-401(2) (2009)
For any consumer loan incurred pursuant to closed end credit, a
lender may charge a periodic finance charge, calculated accordingly to
the actuarial method, not to exceed: (a) 36% per annum on the portion
of the unpaid balance which is $860 or less, and (b) 21% per annum
on the portion of the unpaid balance which exceeds $860 . . . .
178. See, e.g., Speedy Cash, Kansas Store Locations, http://www.speedycash.
com/payday-loans/kansas/locations/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Speedy Cash, Auto Equity Loans,
http://www.speedycash.com/auto-equity-loans/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
179. For a legal definition, see Truth in Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1602(i) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20) (2010).
180. Speedy Cash, Auto Equity Loans, http://www.speedycash.com/autoequity-loans/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
181. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-401(1) (2009).
182. VA. CODE ANN. tit. 15-2, subtit. II, ch. 26 (West 2011).
183. See Attorney General Files Lawsuit Against Local Auto Title Dealer,
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Similarly, reports indicate lenders in Iowa operated this way as
well.184 Finally, lenders hoping to avoid the 36% rate cap on loans
to military personnel are now offering open-ended “payday
advances.”185
2. Credit Service Organizations
Title lenders operating in Texas face a similar interest rate
cap of 30% for loans under $1,800.186 Instead of offering loans
directly to borrowers and thus being subject to this cap, most
lenders operate as Credit Service Organizations (CSOs). A CSO is
defined in the Texas Finance Code as a person who provides
services to improve a consumer’s credit history or rating or to
obtain an extension of consumer credit for a consumer.187 The
statute does not limit the fees a CSO can charge for these
services.188
The purpose of this CSO statute was to protect consumers
from fraud when they employ credit repair organizations to fix
distressed credit.189 The language of the statute defining the
organizations that repair credit, however, is very broad, including
in the definition of a CSO a person who obtains an extension of

DAILY PRESS (Hampton Roads, Va.), May 19, 2010, available at
http://articles.dailypress.com/2010-05-19/news/dp-nws-cash-lawsuit-20100518_1
_open-end-credit-loans-subject-borrowers (explaining that Virginia title lenders
are subject to the state’s 12% rate cap if they do not offer credit as an openended credit plan).
184. See, e.g., Kirchhoff, supra note 122.
185. See DoD Shares Loan Blame, AIR FORCE TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at 4
(“But blame the Pentagon [for] limiting the law’s protections to just . . . payday
loans, vehicle title loans and refund anticipation loans. These ‘advances,’ on the
other hand, qualify as ‘open-ended lines of credit,’ a definition that allows the
banks to completely ignore the law’s 36 percent interest rate cap.”).
186. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.201 (West 2009).
187. Id. § 393.001.
188. Id. §§ 393.001–.628.
189. See Letter from Kymberly K. Oltrogge, Ass’t Att’y Gen., to Hon. Mark
W. Stiles, Chair of Calendars Comm. (Mar. 24, 1994), available at
http://ww.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/lo48morales/lo94-029.txt; see also Eugene J.
Kelley, Jr. et al., The Credit Repair Organization Act: The “Next Big Thing?”, 57
CON. FIN. L.Q. 49, 56 (2003) (reporting that states enacted CSO statutes to
regulate entities that attempt to improve a consumer’s credit rating).
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consumer credit by another for the consumer.190 The Attorney
General of Texas191 and the Fifth Circuit192 have both opined that
companies acting as CSOs are not bound by state usury limits on
loan fees.
EZCORP’s Annual Report summarizes how EZCORP
generates fees as a CSO:
In our Texas stores, we do not offer signature loan or auto title
loan products themselves, but offer fee-based credit services to
customers seeking loans. In these locations, we act as a credit
services organization (or “CSO”) on behalf of customers in
accordance with applicable state laws, and offer advice and
assistance to customers in obtaining loans from unaffiliated
lenders. Our services include arranging loans with independent
third-party lenders, assisting in the preparation of loan
applications and loan documents, and accepting loan payments
for the lenders. We do not make, fund or participate in the loans
made by the lenders, but we assist customers in obtaining credit
and enhance their creditworthiness by issuing a letter of credit
to guarantee the customer’s payment obligations to the
independent third-party lender.193

The Texas legislature recently
specifically address title lenders and
as CSOs,194 but for years, the CSO
lenders in Texas to operate with few
state with a strict usury law.

changed the CSO law to
payday lenders who operate
model of operation allowed
substantive restrictions in a

3. Higher Loan Amounts
A final way title lenders have avoided rate caps is by offering
loans at amounts just above the rate cap. In California, small loans
190. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 393.001(3) (West 2009).
191. See Letter from Barry R. McBee, First Ass’t. Att’y Gen., to Leslie
Pettijohn, Comm’r, Office of the Consumer Credit Comm. (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
192. See Lovick v. Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 442–43 (5th Cir. 2004).
193. EZCORP, Inc., supra note 31, at 6; see also Mary Spector, Taming the
Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and Unintended Consequences, 57
DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 983–95 (2008).
194. See H.B. 2592, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011) (requiring payday and
title lenders to make certain disclosures); see also H.B. 2594, 82nd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 2011) (requiring payday and title lenders to be licensed by the state).
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are capped at 2.5%, but loans over $2,500 are not covered by the
cap.195 Thus, title lenders offer loans for $2,501 at any rate they
agree on with the borrower.196
One predictable effect of avoiding the rate cap by offering
higher loan amounts is that more loans are undersecured. Given
that, in other states, lenders’ loan averages are less than $1,000,
setting $2,500 as a minimum loan amount either drives many
customers out of the title lending market or drives lenders to offer
higher percentages of the value of the vehicle, which in turn likely
leads to more lenders seeking deficiency judgments from borrowers
who default. California offers an example of lawmakers choosing a
side in the debate over whether consumers are better off with
higher loan amounts, even if they did so unintentionally.
C. Authorized but Effectively Unregulated
In several states, title lenders do not operate with legal
uncertainty from obviating usury laws or operate under the weight
of significant regulation because the states explicitly authorize
title lending without any significant regulation. For instance,
Arizona has a statute that authorizes title lending by recognizing
the different forms the loan can take as legal transactions.197 The
195. CAL. FIN. CODE § 22303 (2009).
196. See Fast Auto & Payday Loans, Fast Auto and Payday Loans, Inc. Is
Helping People Just Like You Get the Extra Cash You Need,
http://www.clacal.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“Need a California title loan?
$2,501 to $10,000 Available Now!”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Similarly, in Illinois, title lenders began offering sixty-one-day loans
when the legislature attempted to regulate title loans by passing a statute
covering loans under sixty days. See Stephen Franklin, Loophole Lets Lender
Skirt Law, Group Says, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 25, 2008, at B1, available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-04-25/business/0804241039_1_paydayloans-cash-strapped-borrowers-annual-interest (suggesting that circumvention
of loan term limits is “not new” to Illinois lenders).
197. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-281(13) (2010). The statute governs
“secondary motor vehicle finance transactions.” The definition in the statute
reveals that it regulates title lending because it includes both traditional title
lending and the sale-leaseback agreements some lenders employ:
“Secondary motor vehicle finance transaction”
(a) Means any contract that includes provisions for either:
(i) Obtaining a security interest in or lien on a motor vehicle other
than in connection with the sale of that motor vehicle.
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only specific regulation of these loans, however, is a relatively high
limit on the monthly interest rates lenders may charge borrowers,
ranging from 17% per month (which is around 205% annually) for
loans under $500 to 10% per month (which is 120% annually) for
loans over $5,000.198 Otherwise, the U.C.C. governs these loans as
secured transactions.199
Other states authorize title lending in a slightly less direct
form by simply authorizing small loans, which capture almost all
title loans, but not placing any restrictions on the interest rate for
these loans. New Mexico, as an example, authorizes small-dollar
loans through a specific statute,200 and even makes it a violation of
the small-loan statute to charge a usurious rate based on other
state law.201 However, the small-loan statute does not have a usury
cap,202 and the state does not have a general usury cap.203 The only
provisions governing title loans are the generic ones in the U.C.C.

(ii) The sale or conditional sale of a motor vehicle and the seller’s
right to retain use of the motor vehicle after the sale or conditional
sale.
(b) Includes any conditional sales contract or contract for the
bailment or leasing of a motor vehicle in which the bailee or lessee
agrees to pay for use of the motor vehicle and the bailee or lessee is
required to become or has the option of becoming the owner of the
vehicle for any or no compensation.
Id.
198. Id. § 44-291(G).
199. See generally U.C.C. art. 9 (1977).
200. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-15-1 to -39 (2010).
201. Id. § 58-15-23.
202. See id. §§ 58-15-1 to -39.
203. Section 56-8-3 states that interest rates, “in the absence of a written
contract fixing a different rate, shall be not more than fifteen percent annually,”
but it does not restrict the rate of interest if the parties agree to one in a written
contract. In a similar context, the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that a
statute like this one does not cap interest rates. See Superior Concrete Pumping
Inc. v. David Montoya Constr., Inc., 773 P.2d 346, 348–49 (N.M. 1989) (holding
that the default interest rate set out in New Mexico’s statute governing the
unpaid balance of an open account was not a cap on interest rates if the parties
agreed on a higher rate).
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D. Regulated as a Pawn Transaction
Some states regulate title loans as pawn transactions,
affording title borrowers the same rights as pawn customers. But
determining whether a state’s pawn brokering laws apply to title
lending is sometimes difficult. Some states specifically include title
lending under pawn laws. The Georgia legislature specifically
defines “pledged goods,” the item covered by the pawn law, as
including automobile certificates of title:
“Pledged goods” means tangible personal property, including,
without limitation, all types of motor vehicles or any motor
vehicle certificate of title, which property is purchased by,
deposited with, or otherwise actually delivered into the
possession of a pawnbroker in connection with a pawn
transaction.204

On the opposite end of the spectrum, Maine specifically states
that title lending is not within the pawn-brokering statute. The
items covered by Maine’s pawn law include “motor vehicles, but
do[] not include documents evidencing title to motor vehicles.”205
Similarly, Louisiana limits pawnbrokers to accepting vehicles as
collateral only if they physically possess the vehicle, and the
statute explicitly states: “Under no circumstances shall the
practice commonly referred to as motor vehicle ‘title only’ pawn
transactions be allowed in this state.”206
In the middle lie states where the statute itself does not make
it clear whether title loans come within the definition of pawn
transactions. In Alabama, for instance, it does not appear that title
loans fall within the definition of pawn transactions because title
lenders do not retain possession of the vehicles and the statute
defines a pawn transaction as “[a]ny loan on the security of
pledged goods or any purchase of pledged goods on condition that
the pledged goods are left with the pawnbroker and may be
redeemed or repurchased by the seller for a fixed price within a
fixed period of time.”207 Yet, the Alabama Supreme Court has ruled
204. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-130(5) (2010).
205. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 30-A, § 3960(3) (2009). Thus, title loans are not
exempt from Maine’s usury statute, id. tit. 9-A, § 2-401, despite the fact that
pawn transactions avoid the rate cap, id. tit. 30-A § 3963(1).
206. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1801(D) (2010).
207. ALA. CODE § 5-19A-2(3) (2010).
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that a certificate of title held by a lender counts as a “pledged
good,” making title loans subject to pawn transaction rules.208
The courts have provided certainty that Alabama’s pawn laws
apply to title lenders, but this finding is unique among the states
that have similarly vague definitions of pawned goods. Other
courts have found title lenders are violating usury statutes by
guessing incorrectly that title loans are governed by pawnshop
laws.209
When title loans are governed by pawn laws, a series of
common provisions usually apply:210 the law forbids lenders from
seeking deficiencies and does not require them to pay surpluses;211
loan terms are set at thirty days;212 interest rates are sometimes
capped, but the cap is set at a high amount;213 and lenders must
wait for a set period after default before they may sell the
collateral.214
208. Floyd v. Title Exch. & Pawn, Inc., 620 So. 2d 576, 579 (Ala. 1993).
209. In Chandler v. Kentucky Title Loan, Inc., 16 S.W.3d 312 (Ky. Ct. App.
1999), the court found a title lender was not a pawnbroker under Kentucky law
because “we find a significant difference between the Kentucky and Alabama
statutes with respect to the breadth of the definition of a pawn transaction.” Id.
at 314. Because it was not a pawn transaction, “it was not exempt from
application of KRS Chapter 288 and it operated its business in violation of [the
statute].” Id. at 315.
210. Carrie Teegardin, Title Loan’s Price High, ATLANTA JOURNALCONSTITUTION, Jan. 25, 2009, available at http://www.ajc.com/ajccars/
content/printedition/2009/01/25/titlepawn0125.html (“[T]he fact that the
transaction is technically a pawn means the money comes with the same risks
and benefits of taking a diamond ring or stereo to a pawnshop . . . . Lenders can
sell repossessed cars and retain the entire proceeds . . . even if those far exceed
the balance on the loan.”).
211. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-19A-6 (2011).
212. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-131(a)(1) (2011).
213. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-19A-7(a) (2011) (setting a 25% per month
interest rate cap); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-131(a)(4)(A) (2011) (same).
214. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-19A-5(c) (2011) (“All goods purchased by the
pawnbroker except for automobiles, trucks, and similar vehicles shall be
maintained on the premises . . . at least fifteen business days before the goods
may be offered for resale. Automobiles, trucks, and similar vehicles shall be
maintained on the premises for 21 calendar days.”); id. § 5-19A-4(1) (“Any
personal property pledged to a pawnbroker within this state is subject to sale or
disposal when there has been no payment made on the account for a period of 30
days past maturity date of the original contract, and no further notice is
necessary.”); id. § 5-19A-10(b) (“Pledged goods not redeemed on or before the
maturity date if fixed and set out in the pawn ticket issued in connection with
any transaction shall be held by the pawnbroker for 30 days following that
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In addition to these common pawn law provisions, Georgia has
added a series of provisions specifically directed at auto title loans
that do not apply to other pawn transactions.215 These laws appear
to supplement the standard pawn statute with provisions that are
important to regulating transactions where the debtor retains
possession of the collateral. For instance, Georgia prohibits saleleaseback agreements,216 transactions that only arise if the debtor
retains possession of the collateral (since possession is the major
right granted in leasing a good). Additionally, Georgia’s statute
gives lenders the right to take possession of vehicles upon default
without judicial approval if the lender can do so “without breach of
the peace.”217 Finally, the statute outlines the charges a lender can
levy if it takes possession of a vehicle218 and requires lenders to
disclose these charges to borrowers.219 Because it specifically
regulates title loans through these provisions, Georgia might also
fit within the next categories of laws—laws that directly and
extensively regulate title loans.
E. Regulated Directly and Extensively (Although
not Necessarily Strictly)
Numerous states have laws that were specifically created to
address title lending. This subpart outlines some of the common
features of these laws, although individual states may have only
some of these requirements. In addition, this subpart is not meant
to be an exhaustive exploration of every provision of every state
statute; instead, it attempts to highlight the provisions that are
most controversial and most important.

date . . . .”).
215. Similarly, Minnesota governs title loans with its pawn laws
supplemented by some additional provisions specific to title loans. See MINN.
STAT. § 325J.095 (2011).
216. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-131(a)(2) (2011).
217. Id. § 44-12-131(a)(3).
218. Id. § 44-12-131(a)(4)(C).
219. Id. §§ 44-12-138(3),(12)–(15).
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1. Licensing Requirements

A primary form of direct regulation of title lenders is licensing
requirements.220 Tennessee’s law, for instance, voids any title loan
made by an entity that is not licensed by the state.221 To obtain a
license, a title lender must, among other requirements, (1) have net
assets of $75,000 per location,222 (2) pay an $800 filing fee per
location,223 (3) submit a balance sheet and income statement
prepared by an unaffiliated certified public accountant,224 and
(4) obtain a surety bond of $25,000 per location (not to exceed
$200,000 per firm).225 In addition to requirements for obtaining a
license, firms must report certain information to the state226 and
make their records available for examination.227
2. Rollovers
Many states directly regulating title loans have laws
addressing the issue of rollovers. Tennessee addresses rollovers by
requiring that, after three rollovers, the lenders must begin
reducing the principal owed on the loan.228 Other states specifically
limit the number of times a customer can roll over a title loan.
Some laws limiting rollovers likely have no real effect on the
business practices of lenders. In Delaware, for instance, rollovers
that extend a loan for more than 180 days are formally
prohibited.229 This restriction, however, does not prevent borrowers
from paying off a title loan after 180 days and then immediately
taking out a new title loan from the same lender because “rollover”
under the statute “means the extension of an outstanding and
220. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 5, § 2202 (2011); FLA. STAT. § 537.004
(2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-503 (2011).
221. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-15-105 (2011).
222. Id. § 45-15-106(a)(1).
223. Id. § 45-15-106(d)(1).
224. Id. § 45-15-106(d)(2).
225. Id. § 45-15-106(d)(3).
226. Id. § 45-15-109.
227. Id. § 45-15-108.
228. Id. § 45-15-113(d).
229. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2254 (2011).
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unpaid indebtedness beyond the originally stated repayment
period.”230
3. Repossessions
States regulating title loans directly often provide rules for
lenders attempting to gain possession of vehicles if the borrower
defaults. Like Georgia,231 most states incorporate232—or at least do
not displace233—U.C.C. Article 9’s requirement that secured lenders
not breach the peace while gaining possession of a vehicle.234
Illinois goes a few steps farther, requiring lenders to notify
borrowers of their intention to take possession, afford “the obligor
the opportunity to make the vehicle available to the lender at a
place, date and time reasonably convenient to the lender and
obligor” and permit the borrower “to remove any personal
belongings from the vehicle without charge or additional cost.”235
Other states forbid lenders from purchasing vehicles they have
repossessed,236 despite the normal rule in secured transactions that
permits lenders to purchase goods they have repossessed subject to
some restrictions.237

230. Id. § 2202. For an analysis of this same issue in the payday loan
context, see Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 855, 897–98 (2007).
231. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2259 (2011) (“A licensee may take
possession of the motor vehicle that is used as security for a title loan only in
accordance with procedures specified in part 6 (Default) of Article 9 (Uniform
Commercial Code—Secured Transactions) of Title 6.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2846-507(2) (2011) (“If the debtor does not cure the default within the ten (10)
days, the title lender may proceed to exercise its rights under chapter 9, title 28,
Idaho Code.”); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 38, § 110.140 (2011) (stating that lenders
must follow all applicable provisions of the U.C.C.).
233. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 604A.455(1) (2011).
234. U.C.C. § 9-609(b)(2) (1977).
235. ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 38, § 110.390(b) (2011).
236. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-508(6) (2011).
237. U.C.C. § 9-610(c) (1977).
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4. Deficiencies and Surpluses

Most states that directly regulate title loans require lenders to
pay any surpluses generated by sales of repossessed vehicles and
prohibit lenders from seeking anything from borrowers beyond
taking possession of the vehicle.238 Delaware’s statute provides a
typical example of how the law is formulated:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the proceeds of a
licensee’s sale of a motor vehicle that is used as security for a
title loan shall satisfy all outstanding and unpaid indebtedness
under that loan, and the borrower on that loan shall not be
liable for any deficiency resulting from that sale. The licensee
shall nevertheless still be required to pay the borrower any
surplus arising from the sale of that motor vehicle as required
by part 6 (Default) of Article 9 (Uniform Commercial Code—
Secured Transactions) of Title 6.239

While some states permit lenders to seek payment if the borrower
purposefully prevents the lender from repossessing the vehicle or
damages the vehicle,240 others, like Delaware, even prevent
personal liability in these cases.
5. Restrictions on Loan Amounts
Some states restrict the amount of money title lenders can
lend to borrowers, but different states use different measuring
sticks to set a cap on the loan amount. The simplest caps are fixed
dollar amounts, usually $2,500, that apply to all title loans
regardless of the vehicle serving as collateral, the borrower, or the
purpose of the loan.241 A few cap the loans based on the value of
238. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-508(2) (2011) (prohibiting lender
from seeking any deficiencies from borrower and requiring lender to pay surplus
to borrower); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-411(1), (5) (2011) (same); MONT. CODE ANN.,
§§ 31-1-816(2)(i),-818(8) (2011) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. § 604A.455(1) (2011)
(same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-413(5) (2011) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-15114(b)(2), 45-15-115(2) (2011) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-24-204 (2011) (same).
239. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2260 (2011).
240. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-508(2) (2011) (forbidding deficiencies
except “where the debtor prevented repossession of the vehicle, damaged or
committed or permitted waste on the vehicle or committed fraud”).
241. See ILL. ADM. CODE, tit. 38, § 110.370(a) (2011) (stating title loans
cannot exceed $4,000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-415(f) (2011) (forbidding title
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the vehicle, sometimes providing appraisal guides as a measuring
tool.242 South Carolina’s statute provides one example:
A lender may not make a short-term vehicle secured loan in a
principal amount greater than the fair market retail value of
the motor vehicle securing the loan, as determined by common
industry appraisal guides. If the motor vehicle securing the loan
is not listed in common appraisal guides, the lender shall use
his best judgment to determine the value.243

Finally, and perhaps of greatest interest, some states require
that title lenders base the amount of the loan on the borrower’s
ability to repay the loan. Several states have general language that
requires lenders to assess “the ability of the customer seeking the
title loan to repay the title loan, including the customer’s current
and expected income, obligations and employment.”244 Some
statutes make clear that determining the consumer’s ability to
repay the loan does not require a formal credit check but can instead
rely on the consumer’s reported income and obligations.245 Illinois’s
statute is more simplistic and easy to apply, prohibiting any loans
loans over $2,500); MO. REV. STAT. § 367.527(2) (2011) (prohibiting title loans
over $5,000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-15-115 (3) (2011) (limiting title loans to
$2,500).
242. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-24-202(c) (2010) (stating title lenders may
not “extend a title loan that exceeds the fair market value of the vehicle
securing the title loan”); IDAHO CODE § 28-46-508 (3) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 604A.450(1) (2010).
243. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-413(4) (2011).
244. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604A.450(2) (2011); see also ORS § 725.605
(2010) (“A lender may not make a title loan to a consumer without forming a
good faith belief that the consumer has the ability to repay the title loan.”); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 37-3-413(3) (2011) (“Before making a short-term vehicle secured
loan, a lender shall form a good faith belief that the borrower has the ability to
repay the loan, considering [various factors].”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-24-202(3)(d)
(2011) (“[A lender] may not extend a title loan without regard to the ability of
the person seeking the title loan to repay the title loan, including the person’s:
(i) current and expected income; (ii) current obligations; and (iii) employment.”).
245. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-413(3) (2011) (stating the lender may comply by
having the borrower sign a statement on a separate form “that the information
the borrower has provided regarding employment, income, and expenses is true
and correct and that, given the information, the borrower believes he has the
ability to repay the loan”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-24-202(4) (2011) (stating that
the requirement is met if the borrower “provides the title lender with a signed
acknowledgment that: (a) the person has provided the title lender with true and
correct information concerning the person’s income, obligations, and
employment; and (b) the person has the ability to repay the title loan”).

588

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535 (2012)

that have a single payment that “exceeds 50% of the obligor’s gross
monthly income.”246
6. Restrictions on Fees
Many states that directly regulate title lending set limits on
the interest rates and other fees that lenders can charge.247 These
interest rate caps vary from 18%248 or 30% per year249 to around
206% a year250 or 304% a year.251 In addition to limits on interest
rates, some statutes limit the amount lenders can charge for
noninterest rate charges, such as the fees for dishonored checks252
and the cost of recording a lien.253
As this Part illustrates, states have taken a variety of
approaches even within the framework of directly regulating title
lending. In many states, the law is in flux or uncertain; Part IV
aims to offer guidance to states that are considering changes in
their approach.
IV. Evaluating Title Lending Laws
In light of the different regulatory models discussed in Part
III, this Part argues that the best approach to regulating title
lending is to enact laws or regulations aimed specifically at title
loan transactions. I begin by assessing the case for banning title
lending, concluding that while arguments based on cost may
compel some to accept a ban, the case is difficult to make. On the
other end of the spectrum, states that authorize title lending
without any restrictions or regulate title lending as pawn
246. ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 38, §110.340(a) (2011).
247. Of course, some states, like Delaware, have no interest rate limits. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 2250–2261 (2011).
248. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 41a(b)(4) (2011).
249. See FLA. STAT. § 537.011(1) (2011).
250. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-291(g) (2011).
251. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-413(1) (2011).
252. See OR. REV. STAT. § 725.615(2)(a) (2011) (limiting fees for dishonored
checks to $20).
253. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-817(2) (2011) (limiting charges for
recording a lien to the actual costs to the lender).
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transactions offer too little regulation to ensure meaningful
protections for customers. Finally, this Part makes the case for
industry-specific regulation and suggests laws that are important
for policymakers to enforce to ensure a fair marketplace.
A. The Argument for Banning Title Loans
Bans or effective bans on title lending are a popular regulatory
choice, but the justifications for these bans are not entirely clear.
Based on the data in Part II, we know title-loan borrowers
experience a relatively low rate of repossession, and we have no
evidence that those who do lose vehicles are losing their own
means of transportation. Moreover, in eliminating title loans, bans
may undermine the useful functions title loans can have in
funding small businesses or in helping borrowers with emergency
needs. In light of the weaknesses in the most common arguments
for a ban, the best argument opponents have for drastic
intervention into title lending markets is to reign in the high cost
of the loans.
1. Title Lending’s Spurious Connection to Financial Distress
The case for banning title lending would be strong if
proponents of bans could demonstrate the negative externalities
title lending generates by pushing borrowers into financial
distress. In the states for which we have repossession rates,
however, the vast majority of borrowers do not lose their vehicles—
ranging from over 99% of borrowers retaining their cars to, in only
one year, around 87%.254 Of those who do lose their vehicles, many
likely do not lose a functioning mode of transportation,255 so it is
not clear that title lending is the real cause of the loss. Most
importantly, there is little evidence of how many people lose the
only vehicle in their household.256
For those who do lose their vehicle to repossession, we know
that many lose the equity they have in the vehicle because a lender
254.
255.
256.

See supra Table 2.
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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can charge the costs of repossessing, storing, and selling it. But, in
terms of absolute dollars, the losses are likely small because the
average value of the collateral, and thus the possible equity the
borrower has, is small.257 Moreover, this same problem of
borrowers losing equity exists under Article 9 of the U.C.C., which
also permits lenders to charge costs against the borrower.258
Clearly then, the argument against title lending based solely on
losses from repossession fees proves too much. At the very least,
policymakers who have relied on repossession rates and academics’
fears that borrowers are losing their only vehicles should
reconsider these positions in light of the new reports state
regulators are generating, as well as the fact that no studies have
demonstrated that people are losing their only way to work.
2. Bans Prevent Beneficial Uses of Title Loans
Bans are blunt instruments that eliminate beneficial uses of
title lending along with harmful uses. Based on my small survey
and surveys by the FDIC and a major title lender, some borrowers
are using title loans to meet short-term emergency liquidity crises,
and others use title loans to finance small business operations.259
While it is true that some borrowers are simply delaying financial
breakdown by using title loans for ordinary expenses, a ban also
eliminates the loans for those customers using the product
rationally.
If borrowers cannot use title loans, some commentary suggests
they will turn to other inferior forms of credit or will be denied
access to credit altogether.260 The title lender survey I was
provided seems to substantiate this view, as shown in Table 4.

257. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
258. See U.C.C. § 9-615(a)(1) (1977) (specifying that proceeds of sale of
repossessed items are to be applied first to “reasonable expenses of retaking,
holding, preparing for disposition, processing, and disposing” of the collateral).
259. See supra Table 1 (listing factors motivating borrowers to take out title
loans).
260. Zywicki, supra note 3, at 427 (“If deprived access to title loans, many
consumers would substitute less-preferred sources of credit or risk losing access
to legal credit altogether.”).
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Table 4: Borrowers’ Alternatives to Title Loan
Alternative
None
Credit Unions
Bank Loan
Credit card cash advance
Bounced Check
Pay Late Fee
Borrowed Money from
Relatives/Friends
Payday Loan
Sell car

774
93
154
94
39
189
67

Percentage of
Customers
Selecting
71.93%
8.64%
14.31%
8.73%
3.62%
17.57%
6.23%

8
2

0.74%
0.19%

Number
Selecting

Among the customers we surveyed in Houston, however, the
majority of people said they would just do without if they did not
have access to title loans.261 Table 5 summarizes these results.
Table 5: What Houston Customers Would Do Without Title Loans
Alternative
Get a loan elsewhere

Number Selecting
11

Percentage of
Customers Selecting
31.43%

Sell car

3

8.57%

Not borrow and do without loan

18

51.43%

No answer

3

8.57%

If later research were to show that these results are representative
of title lending customers, they suggest that, for many customers,
title lending is not an essential source of credit that will
necessarily be replaced by an inferior choice. The survey does not
reveal, however, what costs go along with forgoing a loan. But, if
borrowers can avoid using loans, then title lending is a very
expensive form of optional credit. More research is needed to
attempt to assess what borrowers would do if states permitting
title lending banned it.
At the very least, any ban on title lending should recognize the
useful social function title lending can serve for small businesses
and should exempt businesses from the ban. Existing state and
261. If nothing else, the different results from the title lender’s survey and
my survey highlight the importance of what choices the survey instrument gives
respondents. I suggest future surveys always include “choose not to borrow” as
an option for a question about alternatives to title lending.
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federal statutes can act as examples of how to restrict only
consumer uses of title loans. The Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act,262 for instance, only applies to consumer debt.263 The purpose
of the debt is set at the time the transaction begins, and debt
collectors are not bound by the Act’s rules if they are collecting
business debt.264 Even those supporters of a ban on non-productive
or abusive consumer uses for title loans should support productive
business uses of the transaction. A ban on title loans could easily
look to the borrower’s purpose in taking out the loan and exempt
business purposes from the ban or rate cap.
3. Price: The Best Case for Bans
Several of the most powerful critiques of title lending are
merely different ways of stating the simple argument that title
loans are too expensive. For example, the argument that people
roll their loans over repeatedly, paying only the interest fee,
exhibits concern about the ultimate price of title loans. The
critique of the structure of title loans as single lump sum payments
really reflects a concern over the price borrowers pay for the loan,
because the lump sum often requires multiple payments of fees.
Because the high cost of title loans is well established, for
those who are inclined to regulate the cost of services to lowerincome Americans, price is a powerful justification for banning
title lending. It does not appear that an inexpensive form of this
262. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 91 Stat. 874
(1977).
263. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2006) (“The term ‘debt’ means any obligation
or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in
which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the
transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”).
Similarly, Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act defines “consumers” under the
Act and exempts large businesses. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.45(4) (2011):
“Consumer” means an individual, partnership, corporation, this state,
or a subdivision or agency of this state who seeks or acquires by
purchase or lease, any goods or services, except that the term does
not include a business consumer that has assets of $25 million or
more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with
assets of $25 million or more.
264. Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214
F.3d 872, 874–75 (7th Cir. 2000).
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transaction is possible for the clientele currently served by title
lenders, so banning is the only option to deal with this pricey
product if the aim is to eliminate the cost. Especially for those
regulators and academics who are sanguine about interference
with personal decision-making, price seems to be the best
justification for banning title lending.
B. Title-Lending-Specific Laws Versus Pawn Laws and
Regulatory Uncertainty
Several states allow title lenders to operate by structuring the
products to avoid usury limits or by squeezing into laws aimed at
other products like pawn transactions, credit cards, or credit
service organizations. These schemes present two problems for
protecting consumers. First, for states where lenders are not
clearly sanctioned, the legal uncertainty prevents a fully
competitive marketplace. Second, laws that are not tailored to the
title-lending transaction leave customers vulnerable to harm.
1. Uncertainty
When title lenders operate in states without explicit
authorization, it creates uncertainty for these businesses because,
at any time, a court may find a lender has violated the usury
statute. Some states, such as Texas, have clearly indicated that
title lenders can operate through laws not specifically tailored for
them,265 and in those states, firms operate with confidence.266
In states without case law holding that lenders can operate
through other laws, however, the uncertainty is a barrier to
entering the market to compete. For instance, until Virginia
recently specifically authorized title lending (after years of lending
by title lenders through an open-ended credit statute), TitleMax
refused to operate in the state. When the law changed, TitleMax
265. Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 442, 444 (5th Cir. 2004).
266. See Don Baylor, Op-Ed, Loopholes Allow Loan Sharks to Prey on
Hardworking Texans, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 16, 2007, at 9B
(“Payday lending is big business in Texas. In 2003, workers took out 1.8 million
payday loans.”).

594

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535 (2012)

began offering loans in Virginia.267 One consumer advocate in
Virginia so believed in the power of uncertainty that he said
keeping the law uncertain was the best strategy in the fight
against title lenders.268
Stock prices can reflect the deleterious effect of uncertainty on
alternative financial service providers. Gary Rivlin describes the
effects uncertainty had on the stock of Advance America, a large
payday lender, when multiple bills in Congress and numerous
states were introduced that would affect its business: “Advance
America had earned $30 million in profits in the second half of
2008, and then booked another $26 million in profits in the first
quarter of 2009, yet its stock was down by more than 75 percent
from its high because of uncertainty about the payday loan.”269
This sort of uncertainty likely stymies growth.
In addition to fewer firms offering loans in these states
because of disincentives, it is possible that the companies offering
loans in these states are those with the least to lose, because they
are thinly capitalized and essentially judgment-proof. TitleMax’s
refusal to operate in Virginia is instructive: As a large lender with
substantial assets, it is subject to suit if it, for instance, wrongfully
repossesses and sells a borrower’s vehicle. Thus, because
uncertainty decreases the number of companies willing to do
business in a state and may also result in lower-quality companies
operating there, states should enact title-loan specific laws.

267. See TMX Finance, supra note 11, at F9
On April 11, 2010, the state of Virginia passed a new law, the
Virginia Motor Vehicle Title Loan, that eliminates the extension of
credit under the Open-End Credit product and regulates a simple
interest secured loan up to 12 months in term. The legislation
requires all locations to be licensed through the Virginia Bureau of
Financial Institutions. This new law includes a cap on interest rates,
but the cap is higher than the rates currently charged by the
Company. This new law became effective October 1, 2010 and allows
the Company to expand in this state with a product that is now
regulated by the Commissioner.
268. See NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Jay Speer).
269. GARY RIVLIN, BROKE, USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC.—HOW
THE WORKING POOR BECAME BIG BUSINESS 313–14 (2010).
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2. States Without Title Lending Laws Do Not Adequately Protect
Consumers
When a state does not have a law governing title loans, Article
9 of the U.C.C. applies to title loans as secured transactions,
empowering lenders to sue borrowers for deficiency judgments. As
Part II.B.2.b. argues, this ability to seek deficiencies likely only
affects the borrowers with the least valuable vehicles because
these vehicles will not have sufficient equity in them to cover the
costs of repossession and resale. Because it fails to protect the
customers who are likely to be the least advantaged from financial
distress, Article 9 is not a good substitute for specifically tailored
laws.
A potentially powerful counter-argument against my view is
that lenders do not seek many deficiency judgments, so this
drawback is not significant. The legal power to do so, however,
likely gives lenders leverage over borrowers who are afraid of
being sued. Martin and Adams report that lenders in New Mexico
routinely include the right to seek a deficiency in their loan
agreements,270 suggesting that lenders believe this provision
affects the borrower’s perception of the lender’s power. Even if a
debtor is judgment-proof, the threat of a lawsuit may squeeze out
additional payments.
Title lenders operating in states governed by pawn laws are
not allowed to seek deficiencies, but they are also not required to
return surpluses to borrowers. These laws fail to protect those
borrowers with more expensive vehicles. Some title loans are
oversecured, as demonstrated by the $251,047 lenders returned to
borrowers in Tennessee in 2008,271 for instance. Thus, the pawn
laws’ failure to require surplus payments fails to protect a specific
segment of title lending customers.
C. Specific Features Legislators Should Consider
Instead of banning title lending or requiring lenders to fit
within existing credit laws, states should enact provisions
270. See Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 78 (stating that all title loan
contracts the authors reviewed allowed the lender to sue for deficiencies).
271. 2010 TENN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 8.
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specifically tailored to title lending. This section outlines my
tentative suggestions about what I believe are the most important
features title loan laws should include. I argue that states should
forbid lenders from seeking deficiencies, require lenders to provide
surpluses, and require lenders to make disclosures aimed at
overcoming customers’ overly optimistic assessments of the
transactional risks. Also, it is important that any title lending law
provide for flexibility that permits lenders to develop the product.
On the other hand, I argue that caps on loan amounts and loan
interest rates are likely to produce negative consequences. Yet,
because several critical questions remain unanswered, my
suggestions are cautious.
1. Deficiencies and Surpluses
As I have argued, laws allowing deficiencies probably hurt the
least advantaged title-lending customers, so laws specifically
aimed at title lending should account for this risk. In the real
estate context, the purpose of anti-deficiency statutes is “to prevent
the aggravation of an economic recession which would result if
creditors lost their property and were also burdened with personal
liability . . . .”272 Similarly, in this context, states should limit
liability for those customers who likely have the most to lose.
Forbidding lenders from seeking deficiencies will likely also
have the effect of emphasizing to lenders the importance of
considering the customer’s ability to repay, to ensure that
borrowers do not default and leave the lender holding a loan for
more than the value of the collateral. If lenders know they will not
be able to obtain deficiencies or incentivize repayment with the
threat of deficiencies, they should be inclined to make less risky
loans.
Finally, allowing lenders to pursue deficiencies may push
consumers to stay in disadvantageous title loans for longer than
they should. For some borrowers, defaulting on the title loan is a
better outcome than continuing to pay high interest rates month
after month. The cost of losing one’s car might be lower than the
cost of keeping it. Allowing the lender to obtain a personal
272.

4 MILLER & STARR, CAL. REAL EST. § 10:214 (3d ed. 2011).
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judgment against the borrower, however, decreases the likelihood
the borrower will opt to default. As Andra C. Ghent and Marianna
Kudlyak have demonstrated in the context of mortgages:
“[A]llowing the lender recourse to assets other than the mortgaged
property lowers the value of the default option and thus reduces
the borrower’s incentive to default.”273
The negative consequence from limits on deficiencies is that
lenders may offer lower loan amounts to ensure the equity in the
vehicle will pay both the principal amount and the costs of
repossession.274 Requiring lenders to return any surplus from
selling the vehicle mitigates the effect of smaller loans to some
extent; thus, it is an important companion law (assuming U.C.C.
Article 9’s analogous provision is displaced by the title lending
law). If lenders have to return surpluses, borrowers will at least be
protected to the extent their equity exceeds the costs of
repossession. As Part II.B.2 makes clear, however, this protection
is still minimal, so borrowers will suffer in states that forbid
deficiencies by getting lower loan amounts. However, on balance,
the prohibition’s protections probably outweigh the harms.
One legislator has expressed concern over the requirement
that lenders return surpluses because lenders are not protected
when vehicles are not worth anything after repossession.275 The
losses a lender might face, however, are adequately accounted for
in the high interest rate on these loans, so requiring surpluses is
273. Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential
Mortgage Default: Theory and Evidence from U.S. States 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank
of Richmond, Working Paper No. 09-10, 2009), available at http://www.
richmondfed.org/publications/research/working_papers/2009/pdf/wp09-10r.pdf.
274. See MILLER & STARR, supra note 272, § 10:214 (noting one purpose of
anti-deficiency statutes is “to prevent an overvaluation of the security”).
275. See Title Pawn Industry Warns Legislation Could Hurt the Poor,
ACCESS NORTH GEORGIA (Oct. 25, 2005), http://new.accessnorthga.com/
detail.php?n=136791&c=2 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).
Rep. James Mills, R-Gainesville, the House banking chairman, said
it’s too early to say what the Legislature will do, but added he is
having second thoughts about the bill he introduced requiring brokers
to rebate any excess to consumers whose cars have been repossessed
and sold. He said he’s learned that many of the repossessed cars are
junk which do not even cover the cost of the pawn. “If you’re going to
make them give back the excess, what about the times the vehicle is
not worth the loan?”
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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not necessary to balance lenders’ losses. Moreover, it is unlikely
that title lenders would exit a state simply due to a requirement
that they return surpluses because some of the largest lenders
already return surpluses even though not required by law.276 In a
study of pawnbrokers, John Caskey found requiring pawnbrokers
to turn over the surplus did not affect the number of pawnshops
per million residents.277
2. Disclosures Aimed at Optimism and Cost
My limited survey found that the people we surveyed were
overly optimistic about the risks that they would either roll their
loans over multiple times or lose their vehicle. More evidence is
needed to conclusively establish these claims, but I tentatively
recommend that states enact disclosure laws aimed at combating
over-optimism. Marianne Bertrand and Adair Morse have tested
such disclosures in the context of payday lending rollovers and
found that a disclosure informing payday lending customers about
the average rollover rates “reduces the take-up of payday loans by
about 11 percent in a 4-month window following exposure to the
new information.”278 Similar measures could be tested or adopted
for title-lending laws. Generally, firms tolerate disclosure
requirements well,279 so they are unlikely to substantially decrease
the number of firms competing for business in a state.
Another tentative conclusion from my survey was that people
did not understand the relative cost of title lending because only
25% of the borrowers recognized that title loans were a lot more
expensive than credit cards.280 Again, more research is required to
understand generally how title-loan customers understand the cost
of the transaction, but since price is usually the most important
276. See id. (reporting TitleMax returns surpluses to customers in Georgia
even though the law does not require it).
277. See Prager, supra note 90, at 11 (discussing Caskey’s study).
278. Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive
Biases and Payday Borrowing 1 (Univ. Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper
No. 10-01, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1532213.
279. See Anonymous Interview, supra note 24, at 10 (“Industry best
practices include additional, prominent disclosures that go beyond most state
and federal requirements . . . .”).
280. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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term of a consumer contract, and the price is so high for title loans,
requiring clear disclosures seems appropriate.
The best disclosures would show the cost of borrowing per
$100 borrowed, displayed on the windows of the store to foster
price competition. Rules about stating loan cost as an APR281
should be vigorously enforced because lenders should be able to
train staff to discuss APRs. Because most title loans are for onemonth terms, it should be easier for title lenders to correctly
calculate the APR on a title loan than it is for payday lenders,
whose loan terms depend on the length of time until the borrower’s
next payday.282 Since lenders appear to already compete for
customers based on price,283 clear disclosures should be effective in
optimizing competition in the market.
3. Flexibility to Permit Innovation
Some current title-lending laws restrict title lending to its
traditional month-long structure.284 In Texas, however, lenders
have had the freedom to create innovative alternatives to the
traditional title loan. While such innovations have the potential to
harm consumers, in Texas, it appears that the flexible CSO format
has allowed some firms to develop a more consumer-friendly loan
structure in which the title loan is a longer-term, amortizing loan.
Unlike the traditional title loan that requires a lump sum payment
after a short period, several companies in Texas offer loans that act
much more like the ones envisioned by consumer advocates
attempting to reform title lending.
281. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17–226.18 (2012) (setting out Truth
in Lending Act requirements for APR disclosures in consumer loans).
282. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 230, at 904
Interest-rate disclosures are misleading because the amount of the
fee charged generally does not depend on the number of days until
the borrower’s payday. An interest-rate disclosure would suggest that
the rate changes every day depending on which day in the pay cycle
the borrower obtains the loan, when actually the cost is uniform
throughout that cycle. This confusion does nothing to help consumers
evaluate competing products.
283. See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-131(a) (2011) (limiting title loans to
thirty-day terms).
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Cash America, a large public company, has a product that
exemplifies this approach. The company offers twelve- to twentyfour-month loans that are fully amortized and are explicitly based
on the customer’s credit score and ability to repay, along with the
value of the vehicle.285 The cost of Cash America’s product is less
than for normal title loans, closer to 110% APR.286 The company’s
goal in creating this product was to reach a different demographic
than the typical title loan consumer—customers more like
mainstream borrowers who want a product more closely
resembling a traditional loan.287
Additionally, several smaller companies in Houston offer
amortizing title loans with longer terms, but unlike Cash America,
they do not do formal credit checks.288 Texas Title Loans, as one
example, advertises:
With our loans your contract length is 9 months. . . . With our
loans a portion of each monthly payment is applied to your
principal. . . . With [our competitors’] loans you have no ending
contract date. With their loans no portion of your monthly
payment goes to your principal. With their loans the only way to
pay your loan off in full. YOU MUST PAY ENTIRE LOAN
BALANCE IN ONE PAYMENT!289
285. Vaugh & Bourns Interview, supra note 52, at 2.
286. Id. at 4.
287. Id.
288. Are You Trapped in a 30-Day Loan?, THE LOAN DEPOT (Oct. 11, 2010,
10:10 AM), http://www.yourloandepot.com/blog_entries/ai/Corporate-5/are-youtrapped -in-a-30-day-loan.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“WE CAN GET YOU
OUT OF A 30-DAY LOAN AND SET YOU UP ON A TERM LOAN AND GIVE
YOU UP TO 12 MONTHS TO PAYOFF!!”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Advantage Finance, LLC, Frequently Asked Questions—What is a
Car Title Loan?, http://www.cartitleloanshouston.com/pages/faqs.html (last
visited Apr. 8, 2012)

THESE ARE INSTALLMENT LOANS. Portions of your
monthly payment goes to principal and a portion of it goes to
interest. If you make your monthly installment payments
every month when due, your loan will be paid off at the end of
the contract term. THESE LOANS ARE NOT INTEREST
ONLY LOANS. . . . Depending on the loan amount, you can
take up to 24 months to pay off the loan.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
289. Texas Title Loans, Welcome to Texas Title Loans! (June 29, 2011),
http://txtitleloans.net/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington
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Another lender, TJD Financial Services, offers amortizing loans for
the specific purpose of keeping people out of the trap created by
large balloon payments.290 Finally, one other small operator in
Houston offers customers the choice of a traditional title loan or an
installment plan.291
Ideally, a statute specifically governing title loans would be
flexible enough to bring innovative approaches within its domain.
This would encourage firms to compete by offering better loans to
customers, and it would restrain firms from developing products
that violate the provisions in a title-lending-specific law that
protect consumers from abuses.
4. Caps on Loan Amounts
Several states currently limit the amount that title lenders
can give to customers, either by setting an absolute dollar limit or
limiting the loan to some portion of the value of the collateral (as
low as half the value of the vehicle).292
Based on the data we have, I believe these caps on loan
amounts are likely to have negative consequences for borrowers.
The law should aim to incentivize lenders to loan the highest
percentage of the vehicle’s value possible because then borrowers
who lose a vehicle will lose the least amount of their equity. Loan
caps put the risk of repossession on borrowers because they will
and Lee Law Review).
290. See Davis & Davis Interview, supra note 24, at 1.
291. See Magnolia Loans, Title Loans, http://www.magnolia-loans.com/ourservices/loan-services/title-loans/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012)
Your title loan can be structured to fit your preference. If you need a
cash advance for a short period of time and don’t want to make
scheduled payments or commit to a long-term loan, a single payment
plan might be right for you. On the other hand, if you like to have
your payments scheduled so that you know your loan will be paid off
after a certain number of payments, an installment plan is probably a
better option.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For an example of a smaller
company in Arizona that offers a choice between a balloon product and an
amortizing product, see Cash-N-Go, Title Loans, How It Works,
http://www.azcashngo.com/vehicle-title-loans-online-how-works.php (last visited
Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
292. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text.
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walk away from a repossession with no vehicle, less money from
the loan, and probably no surplus because the equity cushion is
likely consumed by repossession costs.293
Moreover, caps on loan amounts do nothing to protect the
poorest title-loan borrowers with inexpensive cars because lenders
will still loan amounts under the loan cap to these borrowers.294 At
best, loan caps protect wealthier title-loan customers by preventing
loans on high value collateral. But it is unclear why regulators
would focus their energy on this group.
The concern with high loan amounts is that borrowers will get
in over their heads because lenders will not carefully consider the
customer’s ability to repay.295 Yet, loan caps based on dollar
amounts are an inapt means of dealing with this problem. They
only address mismatches at high levels of income, while exhibiting
no concern for people who take out smaller loans (e.g., $2,000) but
lack the means of repaying them. Loan caps based on the value of
the collateral also ignore the income of the borrower, ensuring the
lender is protected by not becoming overextended on the loan, but
not protecting the borrower. Finally, loan caps focused on income
do attempt to solve the problem of ensuring a borrower’s ability to
repay the debt, but such caps may result in very small loans being
made on valuable collateral as lenders attempt to comply with the
law, leaving the borrower with lost equity if the lender ends up
repossessing because something unexpected prevents repayment.
The better solution is to encourage lenders to evaluate ability to
repay through disallowing deficiencies. This approach does not
prevent borrowers to get the highest loan amount for their vehicle
as possible. It emphasizes lenders actually evaluating the
borrower’s ability to pay instead of lenders attempting to
demonstrate compliance with the law.

293. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Of course, if a state does not
prevent deficiency claims, laws encouraging higher loan amounts might lead to
lenders seeking personal judgments against borrowers. This is another reason to
forbid deficiencies.
294. See, e.g., Anonymous Interview, supra note 24, at 9 (stating that
Anonymous “believe[s] the consumer is in the best position to make th[e]
decision” about the loan amount, so long as the amount does not exceed equity
in the vehicle).
295. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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5. Caps on Prices

Some states cap the cost of loans,296 and high interest rates
are a concern to members of Congress.297 For those who are
concerned about the cost of title loans but do not want to ban the
transaction, price caps are a compelling compromise.
Commentators predict, however, that capping the interest rate
will result in lenders adjusting other aspects of the transaction.
Zywicki has noted that “term re-pricing” is probably less likely in
title lending because the loans are “very simple and very
transparent loans with a small number of terms.”298
In contrast to Zywicki, I think it is likely that lenders will
alter the transaction to account for price caps. The key term in title
loans other than price that lenders can adjust, even if other fees
are prohibited or other fees are minimal, is the amount they lend
to borrowers. If title lenders are constrained in what they can
charge, they may lend less money to take on less risk from the
transaction. If this occurs, putting a price cap on rates results in
borrowers who lose their car forfeiting more money. That these
borrowers lose the equity they have amassed in the vehicle is a
significant negative for the borrowers who are left worse off from
title loans, so policymakers should avoid setting price terms which
may decrease loan amounts.

296. See supra notes 247–53 (listing states with interest rate and fee
restrictions).
297. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S5346-01 (daily ed. May 12, 2009) (statement
of Sen. Durbin)
[Y]ou would have to be out of your head to get into that kind of a
predicament—a 36-percent annual interest rate. But the fact is
Americans right and left are paying much higher interest rates today
and don’t know it-payday loans, title loans, installment loans. . . . [I]t
is about time we got real here. If we are not going to protect the
American consumers when it comes to some of these interest rates,
they are going to be very vulnerable to some bad practices.
See also 146 CONG. REC. H5179-02 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Roukema) (“Abuses in title loans and title pawn transactions often include
excessively high interest rates and other exploitive lending practices.”).
298. Zywicki, supra note 3, at 430.
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V. Conclusion

A lot of questions about title lending remain unanswered. Are
borrowers overly optimistic about the potential their vehicle will be
repossessed or about the likelihood they will repeatedly roll over
their loan? Do borrowers have other means of getting to work and
doctors’ appointments other than the cars they put up as collateral
for title loans? Do customers understand the relative cost of title
loans?
This Article has offered some preliminary evidence of many of
the contested questions involved in title lending by using data from
state regulators, public filings, interviews with title lenders, and
customer surveys. Based on these data, I argue that states should
enact laws specifically directed at title lending that preserve the
equity borrowers have in their vehicles.
It is clear that a lot of work remains to be done before
policymakers have the information they need to effectively
regulate title lending. Designing a strategy to survey title loan
customers involves challenges because title lending stores are not
generally very busy. Many of the answers to contested empirical
questions will require a research approach that elicits information
from the people the policies are being designed to protect—titlelending customers.
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Appendix A

Survey on Auto Title Lending
Contact: Asst. Professor Jim Hawkins, 713-743-5018
Please circle your answer:
1. Why did you take out this auto title loan?
A. For personal expenses (such as paying bills, getting gas to
drive to work, etc.)
B. For business expenses (anything related to running your own
business)
C. For both personal and business expenses
2. Considering only people living in your same house, how many
working vehicles does your family have? ____
3. How many months total do you anticipate it taking you to
completely pay off this loan (after all renewals/rollovers)?
1
2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12

More than 12

4. If you couldn’t pay off all your bills one month, which bills
would you NOT pay so you could pay on this loan? (Check ALL
that apply.)
___ Rent or mortgage payment
___ Utilities (water, electricity, etc.)
___ Credit card debt
___ Groceries
___ Medical
___ Other: _______________________________________________________
5. Why did you pick this lender? (Check all that apply.)
___ Price
___ Loan amount
___ Location
___ Referral from someone
___ Lender’s reputation
___ Have used this lender previously
___ Other:________________________________________________________
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6. What do you think is the percentage chance the lender will
repossess your vehicle? ____%
7. How does the cost of this title loan compare to the cost of a
credit card?
A. This title loan is a lot less expensive
B. This title loan is a little less expensive
C. They are about the same
D. This title loan is a little more expensive
E. This title loan is a lot more expensive.
8. Is the loan you actually took out more money or less money
than the loan you were originally wanting to get before you came
to the title lending store?
A. I got less money than I had originally wanted.
B. I got more money than I had originally wanted.
C. I got the same amount as I wanted before I came to the lender.
9. How long have you had your loan?
A. I took my loan out today.
B. I have had my loan out ___ months.
10. If you could not get a title loan, what would you do?
A. Get a loan from somewhere else like friends, family, a pawnshop,
or another lender.
B. Sell my car.
C. Not borrow any money and just make do without a loan.
D. Other:
________________________________________________________

